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ABSTRACT
This paper discusses the structural implications 
of real and ﬁ  nancial globalisation, with the aim 
of drawing lessons for the conduct of monetary 
policy and, in particular, for the assessment of 
risks to price stability. 
The  ﬁ   rst conclusion of the paper is that 
globalisation may have played only a limited 
role in reducing inﬂ  ation and output volatility 
in developed economies. Central banks should 
remain focused on their mandate to preserve 
price stability.
However, the globalisation of ﬁ  nancial 
markets over the last 25 years has had major 
implications for the conduct of monetary policy. 
Four elements characterise the new ﬁ  nancial 
landscape: the decline in the “home bias”; the 
increase in the size of international ﬁ  nancial 
transactions relative to transactions in goods and 
services; the increase in the number of countries 
adopting inﬂ   ation targeting and currency peg 
monetary regimes; and the transformation of 
ﬁ   nancial market microstructure. The paper 
argues that in this new environment monetary 
policy should systematically incorporate 
ﬁ   nancial analysis into its assessment of the 
risks to price stability. Monetary policy should 
“lean against the wind” of asset price bubbles 
that could burst at a high cost and hinder the 
maintenance of macroeconomic and ﬁ  nancial 
stability. Further, in view of the interlinkages 
among  ﬁ   nancial markets worldwide, macro-
ﬁ   nancial surveillance at the international 
level needs to be strengthened and monetary 
policymakers need to cooperate and exchange 
information on a wider scale and at a deeper 
level with ﬁ  nancial supervisors.
Finally, the paper reviews the rationale for a 
central bank to act (in concert with other central 
banks) as the ultimate provider of liquidity 
to  ﬁ   nancial markets in situations of extreme 
instability and market malfunctioning. A sudden 
and sharp liquidity drought in the market should 
be tackled with appropriate measures that could 
even go beyond the extraordinary reﬁ  nancing 
of monetary and ﬁ  nancial institutions. In these 
circumstances, the central bank should clearly 
communicate that the aim of its liquidity 
provision measures is to support the proper 
functioning of ﬁ  nancial markets, and that they 
do not indicate a change in the monetary policy 
stance (“separation principle”).
Key Words: Globalisation, Monetary policy, 
Asset prices, Financial markets.
JEL Classiﬁ   cation numbers: E44, E58, F33, 
F425
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Since the mid-1980s the world economy has 
undergone profound transformations, the 
sources and effects of which are probably not 
yet completely understood. The process of 
continuous integration in trade, production and 
ﬁ  nancial markets across countries and economic 
regions (which is what is generally deﬁ  ned as 
“globalisation”) directly affects the conduct of 
monetary policy in a variety of respects. The 
aim of this paper is to present an overview of 
the structural implications of globalisation for 
the domestic economies of developed countries 
and to draw lessons from these implications for 
the conduct of monetary policy, and in particular 
for the assessment of risks to price stability. 
The most prominent stylised fact in the last 
25 years is, from the point of view of the 
economic literature, that the level of inﬂ  ation 
and its variability around this level have declined 
in both developed and, at a later stage, 
developing economies, leading several scholars 
and professionals to refer to this phenomenon as 
the “Great Moderation”.1 But other developments 
have gradually been adding to one another and 
also need to be taken into account. They include 
global imbalances that have emerged in the 
current accounts of some large countries, as well 
as the recurrence of booms and busts with global 
consequences over the last decade and the 
acceleration in commodity prices that ended, or 
at least interrupted, the “Great Moderation” in 
the mid-2000s. 
The ﬁ  rst part of the paper discusses the changes 
in the adjustment mechanism of the national 
economies (to exogenous shocks and monetary 
policy actions), which may help explain 
inﬂ  ation developments. Their implications for 
the conduct of monetary policy are spelled out.
The second part of the paper analyses, within 
a unifying framework, the impact that the 
globalisation of ﬁ  nancial markets has on macro 
and ﬁ  nancial stability. The paper argues that the 
decrease in the home bias in the last 25 years, 
in combination with a simultaneous increase 
(over the last ten years) in dollar pegs and 
currency boards linked to the euro, on one 
hand, and in central banks targeting inﬂ  ation, on 
the other, may have played a role in fostering 
asset price bubbles. Further, the emergence of 
countries with large economies, but relatively 
underdeveloped  ﬁ   nancial systems, not only 
changes the impact of capital ﬂ  ows, but also 
affects the dynamics of exchange rates and 
more generally of international adjustments, 
including in response to global imbalances and 
ﬁ   nancial crises. Central banks need to adapt 
the conduct of their monetary policy in order to 
preserve their ability to anticipate and react to 
international crises. 
The most important implication of globalisation 
for monetary policy is that developments in 
ﬁ   nancial asset markets cannot be benignly 
neglected. Financial market innovation, the 
emergence of new ﬁ  nancial institutions and the 
increasing globalisation of ﬁ  nancial  markets 
pose challenges to monetary policy in two 
spheres. First, asset price dynamics and their 
possible departure from fundamentals-based 
valuation must be taken into account when the 
risks to domestic price stability are assessed. 
Second, given the global dimension of ﬁ  nancial 
intermediation, multilateral surveillance 
procedures must be enhanced with a view to 
incorporating analysis of the international 
transmission of shocks (including economic 
policy) which originate in one economy and 
are propagated to others through ﬁ  nancial 
market linkages. 
Finally, the paper brieﬂ  y mentions the issues 
raised by the need for central banks, in periods 
of severe ﬁ  nancial instability leading to paralysis 
of the ﬁ   nancial system, to contemplate the 
possibility of “non-standard” measures.
See, among others, McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) and  1 
Blanchard and Simon (2001). 6
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1 INTRODUCTION
Since the mid-1980s the world economy has 
undergone profound transformations, the 
sources and effects of which are probably not 
yet completely understood. The process of 
continuous integration in trade, production and 
ﬁ  nancial markets across countries and economic 
regions (which is what is generally deﬁ  ned as 
“globalisation”) directly affects the conduct of 
monetary policy in a variety of respects. The 
aim of this paper is to present an overview of 
the structural implications of globalisation for 
the domestic economies of developed countries 
and to draw lessons from these implications for 
the conduct of monetary policy, and in particular 
for the assessment of risks to price stability. 
The most prominent stylised fact in the last 
25 years is, from the point of view of the 
economic literature, that the level of inﬂ  ation 
and its variability around this level have declined 
in both developed and, at a later stage, developing 
economies, leading several scholars and 
professionals to refer to this phenomenon as the 
“Great Moderation”.2 But other developments 
have gradually added to one another and also 
need to be taken into account. They include 
global imbalances that have appeared in the 
current accounts of some large countries, as well 
as the recurrence of booms and busts with global 
consequences over the last decade and the more 
recent acceleration and fall in commodity prices, 
which has ended, or at least interrupted, the 
“Great Moderation”. 
The debate has long focused on three possible 
interpretations of what lies behind the Great 
Moderation: structural change, more able 
policymakers or simply good luck. Increasing 
globalisation and its initial impact on import 
prices in particular, may have played a role in the 
ﬁ  rst and the latter explanation, either by changing 
the structure of the domestic economies involved 
in international trade or by somehow exerting a 
“mechanical” downward pressure on inﬂ  ation 
trends. This paper reviews the theoretical 
arguments and the empirical evidence supporting 
each of these hypotheses, without presuming 
that they are mutually exclusive. In doing so, 
the paper investigates the wider implications 
of the associated changes in the mechanism of 
adjustment by national economies to exogenous 
shocks and monetary policy actions. We will 
argue that the three explanations above are inter-
related and that, in the future, they may have 
different implications from those experienced 
lately. In particular, the recent increase in oil and 
other commodity prices constitute important, 
different and immediate tests for monetary 
policy, which may have to take into account 
some of the above-mentioned lessons.
The paper also refers to another less studied 
stylised fact, the decrease of the “home bias” 
over the same period, and to other associated 
characteristics of ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows, including the 
high recurrence of asset price bubbles. Another 
feature of globalisation over the last ten years 
has been a simultaneous increase in, on the one 
hand, pegs to the dollar and currency boards 
linked to the euro and, on the other hand, of 
central banks targeting inﬂ   ation. A related 
feature of globalisation is the change in the 
relative size and ﬁ  nancial power of emerging 
countries and developed countries. While 
the US economy dwarfed both European and 
developing economies after the Second World 
War and until the 1990s, the end of the last 
century witnessed the emergence of large 
countries like India, China, Russia and Brazil. 
This decrease of the “home bias”, the spread of 
monetary policy strategies targeting inﬂ  ation or 
involving a peg to a major currency and the new 
distribution of ﬁ  nancial power not only change 
the impact of capital ﬂ  ows, but also affect the 
dynamics of exchange rates and more generally 
of international adjustments, including in 
response to global imbalances and ﬁ  nancial 
crises. These elements also have consequences 
for the conduct of monetary policy, its ability to 
anticipate and react to international crises and 
the nature of international surveillance.
See, among others, McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) and  2 
Blanchard and Simon (2001). 7
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1   INTRODUCTION
The paper is organised as follows: the next 
section brieﬂ   y reviews the literature on the 
impact on inﬂ  ation of the integration of new, 
low-wage countries into the global market. The 
main conclusion of this literature is that at least 
part of the decline in inﬂ  ation in the developed 
economies up to 2007 can be explained by 
the downward pressure exerted by lower 
import prices on domestic inﬂ  ation, which has 
recently been offset by the upward pressure of 
high commodity prices. Section 3 reviews the 
possible structural changes in the real sector 
that could, along with the relative decline in 
import prices, have been responsible for a more 
structural decline in domestic inﬂ  ation  across 
the world. Section 4 extends the discussion of 
the structural implications of globalisation to 
the  ﬁ   nancial sector. In particular, the section 
distinguishes between the possible change in the 
“home bias” and in the allocation of domestic 
savings and, more generally, the macroeconomic 
implications of the high level of integration of 
worldwide ﬁ  nancial markets. Section 5 brings 
together various implications of globalisation 
for monetary policy. Section 6 draws the main 
messages. First, national monetary policy 
strategies must include a structural analysis of 
economic developments, in order to disentangle 
possible shocks to the economy. In particular, 
the role of ﬁ  nancial markets in the transmission 
of such shocks needs to be taken into account 
as their evolution and global integration is 
likely to play a signiﬁ  cant role in the creation 
and distribution of liquidity across countries. 
Indeed, the increased role of ﬁ  nancial markets 
in the transmission mechanism provides further 
justiﬁ   cation for “leaning against the wind” 
of possible asset price bubbles. Second, the 
interdependence of ﬁ   nancial markets across 
the globe strengthens the case for a new, more 
reﬁ   ned multilateral cooperation policy that 
integrates  ﬁ   nancial markets and international 
capital ﬂ  ows with economic developments and 
policy stances. 8
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2  GLOBALISATION AS A NEGATIVE THEN 
POSITIVE SHOCK TO INFLATION
The ﬁ  rst possible explanation of the link between 
globalisation and inﬂ  ation is that the former has, 
at least to start with, generated a persistently 
negative shock to the inﬂ   ation process in the 
developed economies, without altering the 
structure of the process itself. The argument 
would start from one signiﬁ   cant aspect of 
globalisation: the size of the increase in the global 
supply of labour which, with the integration of 
China, India and Eastern Europe into the global 
economy, has increased from 1.5 billion to 
3.0 billion.3 Owing to the relatively low level of 
development of those countries, the increase in 
global labour supply has increased the ratio of 
unskilled labour to skilled labour. Hence, the 
wages of unskilled workers in the industrialised 
countries have declined relative to the wages of 
skilled workers and the rate of return on capital 
has increased. Moreover, due to the secular 
decline in transport and communication costs, 
ﬁ  rms have also relocated the production of goods 
(and services) with a low skilled labour content 
towards the newly emerging countries, while the 
production of goods (and services) with a high 
skilled labour content has been shifted towards 
industrialised countries. In fact, technological 
developments have run so fast that for many 
goods and services it is now possible to allocate 
different stages of the production chain to 
different parts of the globe, according to their 
relative skilled and unskilled labour content. As a 
result, in all major OECD economies import 
prices have declined relative to domestic producer 
prices over the last 20 years. Pain et al. (2006) 
(PKS) calculate that over the period 1996-2005, 
the increasing integration into world trade of 
non-OECD economies – China and other Asian 
economies in particular – reduced annual 
domestic inﬂ  ation by 0.2 percentage points, on 
average, in both the United States and the euro 
area.4 The dampening of inﬂ  ation dynamics in 
the United States and the euro area is due to both 
high import penetration from those low-cost 
producing countries and the relatively lower 
growth of Asian export prices compared to US 
and euro area producer prices.5 Isolating the 
effect of higher import penetration, which 
closely measures the impact of globalisation, 
PKS (2006) estimates that the increasing share of 
imports from China and other Asian economies 
accounts for most of the total disinﬂ  ationary 
effect in the euro area (0.2% per annum, on 
average) over the period 1996-2005, but only half 
of the total effect in the United States (0.1% per 
annum, on average).
Recent analysis undertaken at the ECB  6 
focuses on euro area external trade sector data 
in order to assess the impact of the increase in 
the share of external trade with China and the 
new EU Member States on euro area prices. 
The  input-output analysis reveals that, over 
the period 1996-2004, the increasing share 
of external trade with China and the new 
EU Member States can account for a roughly 
1.5% per annum average reduction in import 
price inﬂ  ation  7 and for a 0.1% reduction in 
manufacturing producer prices in the euro area. 
The average effect on consumer price inﬂ  ation 
is estimated to be around 0.05% per annum. 
Using the results of a VAR model for the euro 
area production chain,8 which incorporates the 
“static” import price shock attributable to the 
“share” effect, the impact on consumer inﬂ  ation 
is around 0.3% per annum, on average, which is 
closer to the estimates reported in PKS (2006).
Furthermore, globalisation seems to have reduced 
the impact of exchange rate changes on euro 
area prices.9 The gradual and persistent decline 
of the US share in euro area imports may lead 
Bean (2006). 3 
PKS (2006) show that while in the United States the impact is  4 
evenly distributed over the decade in question, in the euro area 
the disinﬂ  ationary effect is mainly concentrated in the period 
2001-2005.
In theory, a change in the share of external trade can affect  5 
domestic inﬂ  ation through a “share” effect and a “price” effect. 
The share effect is deﬁ  ned as the change in euro area import 
prices due to the change in the import share of low-cost countries, 
while the price effect designates the contribution to total import 
prices due to import price inﬂ   ation differentials between 
low-cost countries and high cost countries. 
ECB (2006). 6 
The price effect (see Footnote 5) would reduce import price  7 
inﬂ  ation by another 0.5% per annum, on average. 
Pula and Skudelny (2007). 8 
Anderton (2007). 9 9
ECB
Occasional Paper No 106
August 2009
2   GLOBALISATION 
AS A NEGATIVE 
THEN POSITIVE 
SHOCK TO INFLATION
to an automatic decline in import price exchange 
rate pass-through (ERPT) simply because US 
exports to the euro area have a high ERPT of 
around 90%. However, the decline in the overall 
ERPT observed over the last 15-20 years may 
prove to be temporary and reverse once the price 
level of euro area imports from China and other 
developing economies catches up with that in 
other euro area import suppliers. 
Overall, it is fair to say that since the mid-1990s 
globalisation has had a sizeable direct effect 
on domestic price inﬂ   ation in the developed 
economies, which in the euro area has become 
more evident in the last ﬁ  ve years. This direct 
effect can be expected to persist as long as cost 
differentials persist between the developed 
economies and the newly emerging economies, 
which could lead to further import penetration 
from these latter countries into the former. 
This raises the question of how lasting the 
impact of such cost differentials will be. Will 
the decline in inﬂ  ation prevail? Will its recent 
reversal last? Indeed, the increase in the supply 
of labour has been accompanied by an increase 
in the global consumption of food, oil, and 
other commodities: the prices of the latter 
have recently increased strongly and tangible 
counterbalancing effects on domestic inﬂ  ation 
are already visible. This seems to be clearly 
the case already for oil and metal prices and is 
increasingly relevant for staples. Globalisation 
has not only led to a decline in the relative price 
of imports of manufactured goods and services 
but also – especially in the last 5 years – to an 
increase in oil and commodity prices largely due 
to higher global demand originating, inter alia, 
from China and other Asian countries. Hence, 
in oil importing countries, like the United States 
and the euro area, the decline in the relative price 
of imported goods and services has been, at least 
partially, offset by the increase in commodity 
prices that is likely to dampen over a long period 
the beneﬁ  cial effect of the decline in the prices 
of imported manufacturing goods and services on 
workers’ real wages. OECD-FAO (2008) argue 
that, beyond temporary climatic factors, the 
signiﬁ  cant increase in commodity prices over the 
last two years stems from more permanent causes 
directly related to globalisation. First, there is 
the rapid income growth and dietary changes 
in developing markets, especially Asian, where 
demand for protein-rich products is rising and 
thus putting upward pressure on the prices of meat 
and of foodstuffs needed to raise farm animals. 
Second, the direct effect of higher oil prices – 
which are, in turn, attributable to the higher 
demand for energy arising in newly developing 
countries (especially Asian) – which increase 
transport and production costs. Third, the indirect 
effect of high oil prices, which stems from the 
diversion of land and feedstuffs away from food 
and into biofuels. Fourth, a counterbalancing 
effect on the price competitiveness of developed 
countries, which are more energy efﬁ  cient than 
emerging countries, and a lower impact on their 
potential output, which may end up decreasing 
the potential output growth differentials across 
these two categories of countries.
These developments would have at least two 
impacts of relevance to central bankers. First, 
they undermine the use and indicator value of 
core inﬂ  ation. This is because if the trends in 
items included in such concept become directly 
correlated with the trends in items excluded, the 
notion of core inﬂ  ation loses its meaning. Second, 
the increase in oil and commodity prices 
(including food) may lower the real income of 
lower wage workers and increase their inﬂ  ation 
perceptions, making the beneﬁ  ts of globalisation 
uneven, even when abstracting from production 
and competitiveness considerations. Moreover, 
by concentrating price increases on frequently 
purchased products, it may at least temporarily 
distort consumers’ perceptions of their real 
income. To the extent that such perceptions may 
have an impact on the tendency to consume or 
save, on the support of the public for monetary 
policy and on the credibility of the central bank, 
this may also seriously affect the conduct of 
monetary policy. Furthermore, the acceleration in 
the oil price increased at the beginning of 2008, 
as did its impact on headline price indices in 
many economies, conﬁ   rming some recent 
empirical evidence  10 on the crucial role played 
Blanchard and Gali (2007). 10 10
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by both monetary policies focused on the 
maintenance of price stability and by real-wage 
ﬂ  exibility in facilitating the absorption of the oil 
price shock. Central banks may therefore have 
to recall the lessons of the 1970’s oil price 
increases: the need to prevent second round 
effects; the need for wages to quickly absorb the 
corresponding real income loss; and the need 
for special communication in order to minimise 
gaps between perceived and actual inﬂ  ation. 11
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3   GLOBALISATION 
CHANGES THE 
STRUCTURE OF THE 
REAL ECONOMY
3  GLOBALISATION CHANGES THE STRUCTURE 
OF THE REAL ECONOMY
The decline in global inﬂ  ation may have been 
related not only to the direct cyclical effect of 
globalisation on the relative price of imports 
(described in the previous section) but also 
to a permanent effect that globalisation may 
have had on the structure of the real economy, 
in particular on the price and wage formation 
mechanisms, in the developed economies. 
3.1  IS THERE A PERMANENT EFFECT 
ON THE LEVEL OF OUTPUT?
At  ﬁ   rst, globalisation may have permanently 
increased the level of output that an economy 
can produce, without generating inﬂ  ationary 
pressures. The argument runs from the decline 
in the relative price of imported goods, which 
increases workers’ real wages without increasing 
ﬁ  rms’ nominal costs. Hence, for any nominal 
wage, the labour supply in the economy would 
increase because workers would be willing 
to work more for the same nominal wage and 
because new workers would be willing to work 
for lower nominal wages. This process entails a 
rightward shift of the “long-run” Phillips curve, 
which delivers both higher output growth and 
lower inﬂ  ation.
However, this approach does not take into 
account the effect of oil and commodity prices 
mentioned above. Also, in countries with 
low productivity growth, the effect of oil and 
commodity prices on potential output may 
be signiﬁ   cant. Ultimately, the net impact of 
globalisation is an empirical issue. Insofar as the 
euro area is concerned, the latest developments 
in nominal wages and labour costs suggest that 
wage negotiations are only now starting to 
generate second round effects arising from past 
oil price increases. Moreover, the approach in 
the previous paragraph may not give sufﬁ  cient 
weight to competitiveness considerations. In 
fact, it is most valid for countries which have 
the beneﬁ  t of a level of product and services 
specialisation that is sufﬁ  ciently high for them 
to be able to employ mostly skilled workers. 
And even in that case, this does not take into 
account the adjustment dynamics required 
for use to be made of such skills in new ﬁ  elds 
when technology and telecommunications 
make it possible to use low-skilled workers for 
traditional products or services.
Indeed, in those countries endowed with 
potentially skilled workers, the adjustment 
needed to compete with new emerging countries 
entails an increase in the import content 
of domestic production, including in those 
sectors which sell their products in the global 
marketplace. Hence, in developed countries 
the export sector has to go through a phase 
of signiﬁ   cant transitional unemployment and 
persistent lower consumption by workers. 
Thus, the economy may take quite some time to 
return to its medium-term potential output. The 
increase in ﬁ  rms’ investment needed to maintain 
competitiveness is, to start with, associated with 
diminishing production and only at a later stage 
do employment and consumption catch up. The 
example of Germany, and more generally the 
euro area, in this respect is particularly notable. 
Finally, the increase in oil and other commodity 
prices may, if it is substantial and permanent, 
have an impact on the production function of 
many economies. It may thus counterbalance 
the positive effect of cheaper prices for other 
imports, at least for countries that are not 
specialised or energy-efﬁ  cient enough to take 
sufﬁ   cient advantage of the latter. This may 
also lengthen the transitional process described 
above. In any case, the negative impact on the 
production function would reduce the output 
gap, thereby inﬂ  uencing inﬂ  ation dynamics. 
These adjustment dynamics also have 
consequences for monetary policy. First, 
indicators such as the “output gap” and the 
“NAIRU” may be biased, to the extent that the 
usual statistical methods for their measurement 
are based on previous, normally shorter cycles, 
which may result in a spurious ampliﬁ  cation of 
both the decline and subsequent acceleration 
in trend dynamics. Second, the conduct of 
monetary policy may need to take into account 12
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the possibly prolonged adjustment in the export 
sector, generally maintaining lower interest rates 
during the downturn, but also increasing them in 
the recovery at higher speeds and to higher levels 
than normal. This may explain, along with more 
traditional arguments, the observation since the 
start of this century of a substantial deviation 
of observed policy rates in the major developed 
economies from the normative rate prescribed by 
standard Taylor rules estimated on historical data. 
3.2  A PERMANENT EFFECT ON THE SHAPE OF 
THE PHILLIPS CURVE?
A different structural explanation of the observed 
trend decline in inﬂ  ation over the last 20 years 
focuses on the impact of globalisation on the 
mechanism of adjustment to demand shocks. 
In particular, it is argued that globalisation has 
increased the incentives for ﬁ   rms to absorb 
changes in demand by adjusting employment 
rather than the price of ﬁ  nal products. In other 
words, the short-run Phillips curve, which maps 
excess demand  11 onto inﬂ  ation,  has  ﬂ  attened 
due to the increase in trade and production 
specialisation across countries.12 
Admittedly, the empirical evidence concerning 
possible ﬂ  attening of the Phillips curve remains 
rather controversial. Research conducted at 
the IMF and the BIS  13 lends support to the 
hypothesis that the increase in international trade 
and production specialisation has increased the 
importance of global indicators of economic 
slack and inﬂ  ation relative to domestic indicators. 
However, Calza (2007) cannot ﬁ  nd signiﬁ  cant 
evidence of the impact of foreign variables 
on domestic inﬂ  ation while Ihrig et al. (2007) 
show that the empirical estimates depend on the 
speciﬁ  cation of the estimated Phillips curve. 
In a recent paper Benati (2007) provides another 
possible explanation for the ﬂ   attening of the 
Phillips curve, which is rooted in the main 
thrust of the New Keynesian framework. In 
the standard ﬁ  rm pricing rule assumed in such 
models, higher (lower) trend inﬂ  ation increases 
(decreases) the frequency of ﬁ  rms’  price 
adjustments – this being a “deep” parameter in 
the reduced-form coefﬁ  cient of the output gap 
in the Phillips curve – thus increasing (reducing) 
the sensitivity of domestic inﬂ  ation to cyclical 
output  ﬂ   uctuations. Benati (2007) shows that 
historically, and across a large set of countries 
including the euro area, the time-varying slope 
of the Phillips curve is positively correlated to 
the trend rate of inﬂ  ation. Hence, according to 
his interpretation, the decline in the coefﬁ  cients 
of the estimated reduced-form Phillips curve 
for many OECD countries, including the euro 
area over the last two-three decades, is due to 
the progressive conﬁ  rmation of a low-inﬂ  ation 
environment. The standard New Keynesian 
Phillips curve models inﬂ  ation as a function of 
past and expected inﬂ  ation plus some driving 
variable, which is normally the output gap or 
ﬁ  rms’ marginal costs. Hence, assuming rational 
expectations and forward-looking behaviour, 
the trend in inﬂ  ation is affected by the trend 
in the driving variable. This would imply that 
globalisation may have contributed to ﬂ  attening 
the short-term Phillips curve by inﬂ  uencing the 
trend of the driving variable – for example by 
affecting the trend of domestic wage dynamics – 
rather than through integration of the production 
process and increasing international trade.14 
An alternative explanation of the apparent 
ﬂ  attening of the short-run Phillips curve is the 
reduced ability of ﬁ  rms to increase their mark-up 
in the presence of aggregate demand shocks.15 In 
the New Keynesian framework the link between 
ﬂ  uctuations in aggregate demand and prices is 
provided by proﬁ   t margins, or “mark-ups”. 
And, in standard forward-looking macroeconomic models,  11 
inﬂ  ation expectations.
Gali and Monacelli (2005) model a small open economy trading  12 
with an inﬁ  nite number of other foreign economies. They show that 
the more open the economy is and the less substitutable domestic 
goods are with respect to foreign goods, the lower is the coefﬁ  cient 
of the domestic output gap in the model’s Phillips curve.
IMF (2006) and Borio and Filardo (2007), respectively.  13 
Ciccareli, M. and B. Mojon (2005) also argue that, in a sample 
of OECD economies, domestic inﬂ  ation is driven by a global 
inﬂ  ation process, which at short horizons is a function of global 
real developments.
Benati (2007) estimates that output gap coefﬁ  cients, while being  14 
much lower than during the 1970s, are far from being zero, thus 
conﬁ  rming that there still exists a short-run trade off between 
inﬂ  ation and output in the sample of countries considered.
Batini et al. (2005). 15 13
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CHANGES THE 
STRUCTURE OF THE 
REAL ECONOMY
The theory says that whenever ﬁ  rms experience 
an unexpected increase in the demand for their 
product, their cost of production goes up and 
thus they increase prices in order to leave their 
margins unaltered. The competition from labour-
abundant economies reduces the ability of ﬁ  rms 
to pass the increase in costs through to ﬁ  nal 
product prices, because if they did so they would 
lose market share.16 It is fair to argue that this 
explanation conﬂ  icts with the developments up 
to 2007 in the proﬁ   t share (and rising 
employment) in all the major developed 
economies, which took it to historical highs. 
This suggests that rather then squeezing proﬁ  t 
margins, global competitive forces have exerted 
downward pressures on wage dynamics in 
developed economies, thereby directly reducing 
the effect of demand ﬂ  uctuations on the cost of 
production. Furthermore, the fact that inﬂ  ationary 
pressures arising from the sharp increase in oil 
prices over the past 2-3 years have had a 
relatively limited effect also suggests that shocks 
to the cost of production have until now been 
absorbed through a moderation of wage 
dynamics, rather than through an increase in 
ﬁ  nal prices.
Overall, it seems to be true that the Phillips Curve 
has ﬂ  attened. Although this may be a source of 
comfort to central bankers, they also need to be 
aware that the slope of such a Phillips curve may 
rapidly change when the public learns about it. 
In such a context, the consequences in terms of 
output of accepting inﬂ  ation creep and thereafter 
having to combat it – the so-called “sacriﬁ  ce 
ratio” – are also growing.17 
However, the role of globalisation does not 
imply that global slack should be a major 
consideration, at least for large economies. Also, 
the impact of globalisation on import prices, 
which is a very relevant concern for small and 
medium-size economies, is less relevant for 
large economies. Moreover, the ﬂ  attening of the 
Phillips Curve is also attributable to a 
combination of credibility and good luck. 
Indeed, globalisation may also have inﬂ  uenced 
the price-setting behaviour of ﬁ  rms as mentioned 
by Benati. Finally, even if the ﬂ  attening of the 
yield curve is purely connected to the increased 
credibility of central banks, some stroke of “bad 
luck” in the future cannot be ruled out.18 Higher 
commodity prices, particularly if they affect 
agents’ inﬂ   ation perceptions, could lead to a 
steepening of the Phillips curve. 
Rogoff (2003) argues that globalisation may in fact have had  16 
the opposite effect on ﬁ  rms’ pricing behaviour: the increase in 
competitive pressures arising from globalisation makes the cost 
for ﬁ  rms of setting the price at the wrong level much higher than 
in a situation of relatively low competition. Hence, globalisation 
leads  ﬁ   rms to revise their prices more frequently, and thus 
increases the sensitivity of inﬂ   ation to demand ﬂ  uctuations 
(and steepens the Phillips curve). 
Viñals, J. (2000). 17 
This is particularly true in view of the empirical evidence  18 
in favour of the hypothesis that the ﬂ  attening of the Phillips 
curve has been due to “good luck” (Primiceri (2005), Sims and 
Zha (2006) – and references therein – and JEEA (2007)).14
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4  THE GLOBALISATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS
The progressive liberalisation of capital accounts 
that started in the 1980s in the developed 
economies and thereafter gradually spread to 
some of the more advanced emerging markets has, 
over the years, spurred the integration of world 
ﬁ   nancial markets. The higher interdependence 
of  ﬁ   nancial markets and the accompanying 
ﬁ  nancial innovation have changed the monetary 
transmission mechanism. It thus poses new 
challenges to central banks, which must interpret 
the developments in the domestic economy and 
assess their monetary policy stance.
Such challenges can be viewed as being the 
result of interaction among four main factors 
that characterise the latest developments in the 
globalisation of ﬁ   nancial markets. First, the 
“home bias” of investors has decreased, although 
unevenly across the main countries. Second, the 
weight of global ﬁ   nancial transactions relative 
to trade and services transactions has increased. 
At least in the short to medium term, this makes 
ﬁ  nancial determinants relatively more important 
in driving the dynamics of exchange and interest 
rates. Third, such dynamics have been inﬂ  uenced 
by the diffusion across central banks of inﬂ  ation 
targeting and currency board or pegging 
strategies. Fourth, the development of ﬁ  nancial 
markets has spurred ﬁ   nancial innovation and 
its diffusion, multiplying the techniques for the 
transfer of risks and thereby strengthening the 
channels of dissemination and transmission of 
ﬁ  nancial shocks across sectors and countries.
In the following discussion, we ﬁ  rst  analyse 
these stylised facts. Then we explain how their 
interaction may be at the source of a number of 
recent developments. Afterwards, we describe 
how the assessments of global and national 
liquidity help in the understanding in due time 
of such mechanisms, both at the global and 
national levels. Finally, we describe how high 
volatility in global ﬁ  nancial markets, possibly 
exacerbated by the bursting of asset price 
bubbles, affects the transmission of economic 
shocks and poses peculiar challenges to the 
conduct of monetary policy. 
The purpose of the discussion is to propose an 
analytical framework that allows useful lessons 
for monetary policy-makers to be drawn. The 
focus of this section is on the effect of the 
combination of the four stylised facts we 
highlight, rather than on their characterisation as 
“new” developments in economic history.19 In 
particular we are interested in discussing their 
implications for the principles underpinning the 
monetary policy strategy and its implementation. 
4.1  FOUR STYLISED FACTS OF RELEVANCE TO 
THE FUNCTIONING OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
MARKETS
The uneven reduction in the “home bias”
Chart 1 below shows that over the period
1985-2004 the sum of foreign assets and 
liabilities relative to GDP in industrialised 
countries and in the emerging and developing 
countries increased by a factor of more than
3 and more than 1.5, respectively. 
The rapid increase in cross-border investment 
ﬂ  ows fostered by the liberalisation of national 
ﬁ  nancial markets, in combination with the decline 
in communication costs and vibrant ﬁ  nancial 
innovation, has certainly contributed to reducing 
the so-called “home bias” of domestic investors 
over the last two decades.
The paper does not enter into this discussion. For an interesting  19 
reading on this topic, see Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).
Chart 1 Ratio of sum of foreign assets and 
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Admittedly, the process has not been homogeneous 
across countries, the result being an increased 
heterogeneity of participants in international 
ﬁ  nancial markets. For instance, in the United States, 
the diversiﬁ  cation of residents’ investments into 
foreign assets peaked in around the mid-1990s.20 
In the rest of the industrialised countries and in 
those more advanced emerging economies that 
have opened up to global capital markets the 
process started in the early 1990s and peaked 
around the beginning of the new decade when the 
correction in the US stock market led to a reversal 
of the ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows from the rest of world into 
the United States.21 Therefore, it is fair to say that 
since the mid-1990s the decline in the “home bias” 
at a global level has decelerated signiﬁ  cantly.22 
However, important structural factors remain that 
justify the persistence of ﬁ  nancial  ﬂ  ows  from 
emerging and newly industrialised countries 
towards countries with more developed and deeper 
ﬁ   nancial markets. First, private investors from 
emerging countries who do not beneﬁ  t in their home 
country from sufﬁ  ciently liquid and safe ﬁ  nancial 
markets may ﬁ  nd it convenient to invest their funds 
in lower-return foreign assets, either because they 
are less risky or because these assets are simply 
not available in their home country. Second, 
ofﬁ  cial investors, like the central banks of Asian 
countries that peg their currency to the dollar, may 
also invest in developed countries’ ﬁ  nancial assets 
(not necessarily dollar-denominated) as a result of 
having sufﬁ  cient reserves to guarantee the stability 
of such pegs. In particular, countries with excess 
savings and still-embryonic ﬁ  nancial markets have 
accumulated large amounts of ofﬁ  cial  reserves, 
which are not necessarily managed in the same 
way as assets held by private investors. Hence, the 
relative size of players in global ﬁ  nancial markets 
and their degree of risk aversion has become 
strongly heterogeneous, as shown by the attention 
given in the media as well as by the OECD and the 
IMF to sovereign wealth funds. 
Financial versus trade and services transactions
Another related stylised fact concerning global 
markets is that, in developed economies, the size of 
ﬁ  nancial transactions has grown strongly relative 
to the size of trade and services transactions. 
This is the result of the continued deepening of 
developed  ﬁ   nancial markets and of relentless 
ﬁ  nancial innovation, as manifested by the signiﬁ  cant 
growth in the size of their derivative markets. As a 
consequence, the role of global ﬁ  nancial markets 
and their linkages in the transmission of economic 
shocks, both domestically and internationally, 
has increased substantially in the last decade and 
even exchange rate movements across currencies 
with deep ﬁ  nancial markets may now be driven 
more than in the past by global private and ofﬁ  cial 
portfolio reshufﬂ  ing, rather than current account 
positions.23
The spread of inflation targeting and currency 
pegs in the world of central banking 
Since the mid 1990s, currency boards and 
inﬂ   ation targeting techniques have spread 
rapidly across central banks.24 
In the early 1990s, currency boards were viewed 
as miracle solutions to the problem of how 
Greenspan (2003). 20 
Insofar as the euro area is concerned, the introduction of the euro  21 
gave a further boost to diversiﬁ  cation by domestic investors. In 
fact, the elimination of the intra-area exchange rate risk spurred 
foreign investment in debt instruments across euro area countries. 
Foreign investment in equities has been less pronounced as 
national stock markets remain rather segmented.
Greenspan (2003). 22 
Brender and Pisani (2007). 23 
The data in Table I should be interpreted with caution as it is  24 
difﬁ   cult to categorise exchange rate and monetary regimes, 
owing to possible differences between the de jure regime and the 
de facto regime implemented by the policy authorities.
Chart 2 Share of advanced countries in 
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to achieve monetary stability at low cost in 
emerging economies. As a result, currency boards 
pegging to the dollar and to the euro proliferated. 
However, it has soon became apparent that 
they were sometimes attracting capital inﬂ  ows 
invested in real estate or in low productivity 
projects ﬁ  nanced in foreign currencies, thereby 
creating ﬁ  nancial risks that would materialise in 
the event of appreciation of such currencies. 
Inﬂ  ation targeting has been successfully adopted 
by a number of central banks in developed 
and emerging countries. This monetary policy 
strategy (recommended by the IMF) is now used 
by a majority of central banks. However, until 
now, such inﬂ  ation targeting has concentrated 
on the pursuit of price stability at horizons of 
two to three years, generally giving low weight 
to the need to monitor and possibly react to asset 
price developments.
Moreover, the spread of inﬂ  ation  targeting 
techniques has coincided with a debate on the 
need to “lean against the wind” in response 
to asset price bubbles which, until mid-2007, 
mostly tilted in the direction of “inaction” 
under the inﬂ  uence of the Federal Reserve’s 
and particularly of A. Greenspan’s views. 
Indeed, it was believed that asset price 
disequilibria were impossible to identify at an 
early stage and that any action by the central 
bank would either be unsuccessful or harmful 
and, ultimately, generate moral hazard.
However, as shown by Christiano et al. (2008) 
in a closed economy context, the very application 
of inﬂ   ation targeting in the presence of an 
expanding bubble might lead to a policy stance 
that actually encourages the persistent deviation 
of asset prices from their fundamental value.25 
This may explain why, as remarked by a number 
of observers, the occurrence of asset price 
bubbles appears to have increased in a
low-inﬂ   ation context, in which inﬂ  ation 
targeting central banks are usually not 
monitoring money and credit sufﬁ  ciently. 
Financial innovation and the transfer of risks 
Finally, over the last 20 years, the integration of 
global ﬁ  nancial markets has been accompanied 
by increasing ﬁ   nancial development and 
liberalisation. In theory, ﬁ  nancial  innovation, 
by deepening and completing ﬁ  nancial markets 
is supportive of economic growth and improves 
the allocation of savings. New computing and 
information processing technologies have 
favoured the rise of new – often esoteric – 
ﬁ   nancial instruments explicitly designed to 
un-bundle and re-package the payments and 
risks associated with more primitive and more 
The logic of the argument relies on the stickiness of nominal  25 
wages, which prevents them from increasing sufﬁ  ciently  in 
response to an expected productivity shock. Hence, the required 
increase in the real wage can only occur through a decline in 
the inﬂ  ation rate. But this would prompt the inﬂ  ation targeting 
central bank to lower interest rates so reinforcing the stimulus 
arising from the expected increase in productivity. The decline in 
the interest rate would also trigger a credit boom.
Table 1 The spread of inflation targeting and currency pegs
Exchange rate regime Monetary policy framework
Exchange rate anchor Monetary target Inﬂ  ation targeting IMF Supported Other
Other currency as legal tender 10 (14)
Currency board 13 (8)
Other ﬁ  xed peg (single currency) 63 (21) 2 1
Other ﬁ  xed peg (composite) 7 (30)
Peg with horizontal bands 5 (7) 2
Crawling pegs 6 (13) 1
Crawling bands 1 (3)
Managed ﬂ  oating 48 17 9 7 15
Independently ﬂ  oating 35 (42) 2 16 17
Fixed 105 (96)
Floating 83 (42) 19 25 {7} 17
Sources: IMF (2007). Pétursson (2000, 2004). 
Notes: Numbers in the table refer to April 2007. In brackets to 1991. In curly brackets to 1997.17
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conventional ﬁ  nancial products and securities. 
Chart 3 below shows the rampant growth, ﬁ  rst 
in the United States and then in the euro area, of 
asset-backed securities (ABSs) and mortgage-
backed securities (MBSs) issuance (in millions 
of USD) over the past 10 years.26
This phenomenon – originally intended to 
improve the distribution of risk across savers – 
was later boosted by lending institutions in 
search of higher returns. That led to exponential 
growth of credit derivatives, such as credit 
default swaps (CDSs) and collateralised debt 
obligations (CDOs). Chart 4 documents the 
sudden and sharp increase in global CDS and 
CDO issuance over the last three years. In the 
ﬁ  rst half of 2008 its notional value is estimated 
to have reached USD 54 trillion.27
Along with many beneﬁ  ts, like a better way for 
intermediaries to diversify risk, thereby reducing 
the transaction costs of investing and expanding 
access to capital, these developments went
hand-in-hand with two side effects: a great 
increase in leverage and an unprecedented 
expansion of marketing of ﬁ  nancial 
instruments. 
The shift in banks’ balance sheets away 
from holdings of relatively illiquid assets 
(e.g. mortgage loans) to a business model in 
which banks originate an underlying loan that 
is then made tradable and negotiated in the 
open market (the so-called “originate-and-
distribute model”) has made it harder to draw 
clear distinctions between previously distinct 
categories of ﬁ  nancial players. New investors – 
notably hedge funds – have been born out of the 
need for market-makers in previously unknown 
types of securities. But, more importantly 
perhaps, by allowing credit risk to be transferred 
across agents from different countries, these 
developments have also given rise to the 
uncontrolled transfer of liquidity risk across 
countries and continents.
This ﬁ  gure is based on a new dataset developed at the European  26 
Central Bank (see Poloni and Reynaud (2008)). The European 
Securitisation Forum (ESF (2008), Tables 2.1 and 2.2, page 5) 
calculates the total amount outstanding at the end of the ﬁ  rst 
quarter of 2008 of ABSs and MBSs in the United States as
€6.3 trillion. As of the same quarter, the total amount outstanding 
in Europe was €1.2 trillion. Data for the euro area are not 
available.
The International Swaps and Derivatives Association (2008).  27 
The data in Chart 4 for 2008 are estimates calculated in 2006.
Chart 3 ABS and MBS total issuance:
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4.2  HOW THESE FOUR FACTORS HAVE 
INTERACTED OVER THE RECENT PAST
The four stylised facts discussed above – and 
their interaction – provide one possible key for 
interpreting both the overall increase in inter-
linkages across ﬁ  nancial markets and the recent 
history of economic and ﬁ  nancial  tensions 
across large countries.
4.2.1 THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE INTER-
LINKAGES IN GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS
The liberalisation of cross-border capital ﬂ  ows 
and the vibrant developments in innovative 
ﬁ   nancial markets over the last two decades, 
combined with the increased readability of 
monetary policies aimed at price stability, have 
facilitated and thereby increased the linkages 
between ﬁ  nancial markets across the globe, thus 
making the adjustment mechanism of domestic 
economies – and the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism – more prone to be affected by 
developments in foreign economies. The sheer 
size of global cross-border capital ﬂ  ows certainly 
inﬂ  uences the price of assets in any economy by 
contributing to determining both the supply and 
demand and the premiums that investors require 
for holding certain assets.28 There is a ﬂ  ourishing 
literature supporting the view that the transmission 
of ﬁ  nancial market developments across the world 
has increased in recent years. Domestic markets 
increasingly react to economic news expected to 
change the path of policy rates in some “centre” 
country, which is normally the United States.
Ehrmann et al. (2005)  29 underline the importance 
of international spillovers, both within asset 
classes and across ﬁ  nancial markets. Although 
the strongest international transmission of shocks 
takes place within asset classes, they ﬁ  nd evidence 
that international cross-market spillovers are 
signiﬁ  cant, both statistically and economically. 
For instance, shocks to US short-term interest 
rates exert a substantial inﬂ  uence on euro area 
bond yields and equity markets: over the period 
1989-2004, they explain as much as 10% of 
overall euro area bond market movements. But 
the transmission of shocks also runs in the 
opposite direction; in particular, short-term 
interest rates in the euro area have a signiﬁ  cant 
impact on US bond and equity markets. 
Furthermore, they show that in almost all cases 
the direct transmission of ﬁ  nancial shocks within 
asset classes is magniﬁ  ed substantially, mostly by 
more than 50%, via indirect spillovers through 
other asset prices. In a more recent contribution, 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2006) focus on the link 
between US monetary policy and the stock 
market in foreign countries and show that
US monetary policy shocks have signiﬁ  cant and 
in some cases sizable effects on foreign stock 
prices. Moreover, they provide evidence that
US monetary policy shocks affect foreign stock 
markets through foreign short-term interest rates 
and exchange rate changes. Finally, they show 
that the sensitivity to US monetary policy shocks 
is higher in those countries that are more 
integrated globally – rather than only with the 
United States – in real and ﬁ  nancial terms. This 
latter result suggests that the domestic ﬁ  nancial 
conditions in any given country do not necessarily 
depend solely on the ﬁ  nancial conditions in the 
US market, which is the most developed and 
liquid in the world, but also on second-round 
effects arising from the complex web of global 
ﬁ  nancial and real linkages.30 
4.2.2 THE STYLISED FACTS ALSO HELP EXPLAIN 
RECENT FINANCIAL TENSIONS AT THE 
GLOBAL LEVEL
The above-mentioned four stylised facts can 
help explain some of the recent economic 
Bernanke (2007). 28 
The authors argue that an important part of the behaviour  29 
of  ﬁ  nancial markets is explained by foreign asset prices. On 
average, about 26% of movements in European ﬁ  nancial assets 
are attributable to developments in US ﬁ  nancial markets, while 
about 8% of US ﬁ  nancial market shifts are caused by European 
developments. The larger importance of US markets is found 
to be particularly strong in the case of equity markets; for 
instance, movements in US stock prices trigger corresponding 
change in the euro area, with more than 50% of the US market 
developments being reﬂ   ected in euro area stock prices. By 
contrast, European equities have an insigniﬁ  cant impact on their 
American counterparts.
More recently, Bayoumi and Swinston (2007) analyse the  30 
transmission of movements between real bond yields and 
inﬂ  ation expectations across a number of countries. Based on 
high frequency data for inﬂ  ation-indexed bonds they ﬁ  nd that 
the causation in real bond yields runs unequivocally from the 
United States to the other countries in the panel. The spillover 
in inﬂ  ation expectations appears to be less important and the 
direction of causation is less clear.19
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developments that have occurred both in 
individual countries and at the global level. First, 
as explained above, the decrease in “home bias” 
implies, in principle, that domestic investors 
are able to reduce the risk of their portfolio 
without foregoing expected returns.31 Hence, 
the propagation of shocks to the economy 
through the ﬁ   nancial system is likely to be 
smoother than it would be with a lower level 
of country-diversiﬁ  cation. Also, the stability of 
the ﬁ  nancial system itself in the face of ﬁ  nancial 
shocks or changes in investors’ attitude to risk 
is, in principle, higher. However, many elements 
may also make the beneﬁ  ts of the decrease in 
“home bias” volatile and also mean that it 
actually generates costs. The beneﬁ  ts  should 
be contrasted with the cost of the speculative 
bubbles which are inherent to the functioning of 
capital markets.32 A case in point is the bursting 
of the 2001 bubble in the US stock market, which 
coincided with a slowdown in growth in many 
countries. Another is the Asian crisis in 1998, 
which did not affect regional stock markets only 
but also local bond, debt and currency markets. 
The size of its costs for local economies led a 
number of affected countries in the region to 
switch to economic and ﬁ  nancial policies aimed 
at accumulating substantial foreign exchange 
reserves. As to the current ﬁ  nancial  turmoil, 
which started as a localised real estate crisis, it 
affects the United States, the euro area and other 
European countries as a result of the recently 
developed risk transfer techniques, not only as a 
consequence of the dynamics of their respective 
exchange rates, but also through its impact on 
the money, bond and stock markets in both 
economic areas.
Second, the growing importance of international 
ﬁ  nancial transactions over the last 25 years may 
mean that investors’ behaviour and portfolio 
reshufﬂ   ing could affect asset and foreign 
exchange markets in a novel way. Instead of 
reﬂ   ecting fundamentals and their prospects, 
global asset and foreign exchange markets may 
in some instances be less volatile than normal 
over extended periods and thereafter exhibit 
disorderly behaviour. This implies that several 
regimes of ﬁ   nancial and foreign exchange 
market volatility may successively prevail. 
Chart 5 shows the standard deviation of asset 
and foreign exchange prices in selected markets.33 
In both US and euro area stock markets the 
evidence of a “regime shift” occurring in around 
the mid-1980s is quite evident. By contrast, 
frequent switches in “volatility regime” are 
apparent in the exchange rate graphs. 
If exchange rates are less driven by current 
account deﬁ   cits or surpluses and more by 
capital  ﬂ  ows  and  ﬁ   nancial developments, the 
deﬁ  nition of their equilibrium levels becomes 
less precise. In particular, regimes of low 
exchange rate and ﬁ  nancial  market  volatility 
and regimes of high volatility can be at once 
more lasting and alternate more swiftly. On the 
one hand, low exchange rate volatility seems 
to further encourage the decrease in “home 
bias” (ECB 2006) and therefore the apparent 
disconnection between traditional fundamentals 
and exchange rates, prolonging low-volatility 
periods. The period 2004-2007 offers an example 
of such a regime between large currencies, with 
low exchange – rate volatility prevailing despite 
strong current-account imbalances, and even 
in the presence of large and non-fundamentals 
based exchange rate movements (euro/yen). 
At the same time, switches to high volatility 
regimes happen whenever unexpected ﬁ  nancial 
developments lead to ﬁ  nancial instability, which 
itself prompts exchange rate instability and a 
pause or a reversal in the decrease in the “home 
bias”. The periods between the US stock market 
crash and 2004 and also the developments since 
late 2007 offer such an example. 
Third, speculative bubbles and strong ﬁ  nancial 
ﬂ   ows accompanied by low exchange rate 
The seminal contribution is Markowitz (1952), who shows how  31 
the variance of a portfolio with the same mean return decreases 
when the correlation of the assets composing the portfolio 
declines. Grubel (1968) and Solnik (1974) were the ﬁ  rst papers 
to illustrate how investing in foreign assets represents a possible 
diversiﬁ  cation strategy that lowers the variance of a portfolio.
This paper takes an agnostic view as to whether the formation of  32 
asset price bubbles is rational or irrational. The aim is to discuss 
the effects of disequilibrium capital ﬂ  ows on domestic monetary 
policy, irrespective of the nature of asset price bubbles. 
The standard deviation plotted in the charts is computed over a  33 
30-day moving window.20
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Chart 5 The volatility of the US and the euro area stock markets and of the USD/EUR 
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volatility may develop and amplify large current-
account disequilibria (or “global imbalances”) 
and make them more persistent than would 
usually be expected. The US example is well 
known. Low exchange rate volatility combined 
with the desire of foreign governments in Asia 
and OPEC to invest their reserves in dollars led 
to an extremely low yield curve, especially at its 
long end. This allowed for easy ﬁ  nancing of a 
real estate boom, leading in turn to an increase 
in US household wealth, which raised private 
consumption growth and household leverage at 
the cost of a continuous decline in savings. 
These developments are not dissimilar in their 
fundamental characteristics from what had 
already happened in the second half of the 
1990s, when the high-tech bubble in the United 
States was substantially ﬁ  nanced by speculative 
investments ﬂ  ows originating in Europe, where 
ﬁ  nancial institutions and private investors used 
the opportunity provided by low interest rates to 
borrow in euro and invest in the technological 
sector of the US stock market. In other words, the 
issue of global imbalances arises from a situation 
with the following characteristics: a combination 
of countries with excess savings and a country 
with low savings but an attractive ﬁ  nancial 
centre leads to the development of an asset price 
movement. The latter gives rise to an increase in 
consumers’ wealth, which in turn justiﬁ  es and 
perpetuates the lower savings – and increasing 
leverage – of the low savings country.
Fourth, those countries experiencing low 
inﬂ   ation and low exchange rate volatility are 
also more likely to be originators of capital 
ﬂ   ows that may ultimately fuel an asset price 
bubble in the destination country. For example, 
the US stock market bubble that developed in 
the second half of the 1990s was partly ﬁ  nanced, 
close to its apex, by Europe-based investors 
driven by the expectation of a protracted period 
of productivity growth in the United States. At 
the time, the continuous depreciation of the euro 
against the dollar provided further incentives 
for capital to ﬂ  ow from Europe into the United 
States. Moreover, in the euro area interest rates 
were low and inﬂ   ation developments were 
moderate and smooth, while US interest rates 
were relatively higher despite subdued price 
developments. 
Low inﬂ   ation volatility periods may also 
facilitate large capital movements through so-
called “carry trades”, which may ultimately 
lead to large deviations of exchange rates from 
equilibrium. A recent and much discussed 
example is the carry trade organised by global 
ﬁ   nancial investors by borrowing in Japanese 
yen and investing the proceeds in many other 
countries that were either following a successful 
inﬂ   ation targeting strategy or had a currency 
board or a peg to a major currency. Once again, 
the low inﬂ  ation and interest-rate environment in 
Japan – and the expectation that it would endure – 
fostered large capital outﬂ  ows from Japan into 
high-yielding markets, until the eruption of the 
ﬁ  nancial crisis in June 2007 and the consequent 
increase in asset price volatility. The apparently 
lasting proﬁ  tability of such carry-trade activities, 
combined with a sustained depreciation of the 
yen over protracted periods, raised questions 
that only ceased to be asked when the ﬁ  nancial 
crisis erupted and reversed the depreciation of 
the yen.
These events suggest that the initial success of 
monetary policy and exchange rate regimes, like 
inﬂ  ation targeting and currency pegs, could have 
contributed to the development of large capital 
ﬂ  ows from one country to another. For example, 
the spread of inﬂ  ation targeting strategies across 
central banks in both developed and developing 
economies may have increased the recent 
intensity of carry trades. Indeed, if an inﬂ  ation-
targeting central bank in a country with low 
interest rates does not lean against excess credit 
creation, the corresponding liquidity, if not used 
to ﬁ  nance local assets, may fund carry trades 
towards other higher-inﬂ  ation  or  higher-
expected-return countries. This may reﬂ  ect 
underdeveloped ﬁ  nancial markets or the lack of 
equilibrating investment opportunities in the 
source country. If the recipient country is a 
credible inﬂ  ation ﬁ  ghter, its bilateral exchange 
rate will tend to appreciate because the capital 
inﬂ   ows will increase its asset prices. As a 22
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consequence, wealth effects will increase 
consumption growth while inﬂ  ation  remains 
subdued, at least for some time. In such 
circumstances, investors in the originating 
country will see their expectation of higher 
returns validated and may be encouraged to 
continue pouring capital into the high-yielding 
assets. This is probably the story that can be told 
about the developments observed from 2005 
until mid-2007 between the yen and the
New Zealand and Australian dollar (as well as 
many Eastern European currencies),34 but it also 
characterises the dynamics of the euro/dollar 
exchange rate between 1999 and 2001. 
Finally, past and more recent ﬁ  nancial  crisis 
episodes show a common element: the bursting 
of the asset price bubble causes investors to 
abandon their optimistic and self-fulﬁ  lling 
expectations and capital ﬂ  ows unravel. It is at 
this point in time that many factors, including the 
nature of the actual investors – i.e. households, 
ﬁ  nancial institutions, pension and trust funds – 
and the positions taken on derivative markets 
by operators to cover and transfer risks, affect 
the way the capital inﬂ  ow reversal impacts on 
economic developments and the transmission of 
monetary policy in both the country receiving 
and the one originating the capital ﬂ  ows.  As 
apparent in the recent ﬁ   nancial turmoil, the 
uncertainty about the identity of economic agents 
participating in the sharing of risk may also 
create liquidity risk in many markets. Hence, 
it is increasingly likely that asset price bubbles 
will have an international impact and make it 
more difﬁ  cult to gauge in real time the location 
of such impact. Under such circumstances the 
time needed to identify such risks may be part 
of the crisis dynamics themselves.
The bursting of a bubble may not be the end 
of the story however, as the way this burst is 
managed by monetary and ﬁ  scal  authorities 
may itself give rise to other bubbles. In the US 
case, the decision to keep interest rates low for a 
long period after 2001 may have encouraged the 
subsequent real-estate bubble. In the Japanese 
case, one may argue that once the balance sheets 
of banks had been repaired, the lack of sufﬁ  cient 
measures to curtail the growing size of the public 
debt caused Japanese private agents to search for 
higher returns abroad. Indeed, their substantial 
savings might have been accompanied by a 
reluctance to invest in a country where the 
perspective of increasing tax rates is a natural 
consequence of the level of public debt. This 
also leads to delays in interest-rate increases 
by the central bank, which is concentrating on 
low inﬂ  ation forecasts, thereby encouraging and 
facilitating the development of carry trades.
4.3  GLOBALISATION AND ITS REFLECTION 
THROUGH MONETARY AGGREGATES
Overall, not only the faster transmission 
of shocks across asset classes and across 
countries, but also the dynamics of asset price 
developments, of the associated ﬂ  ows  of 
capital and of boom-bust movements need to 
be understood in order to explain the monetary 
and ﬁ  nancial impact of globalisation, including 
global imbalances. This implies that, apart from 
the real economy developments described in 
Sections 2 and 3, monetary policy assessments 
now need to take into account the developments 
arising from the interplay of the four above-
mentioned stylised facts. This task is somewhat 
facilitated by having recourse to the concept 
of global liquidity. However, another useful 
approach is to develop the analysis of monetary 
aggregates and ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows to complement 
the usual economic analysis. This approach also 
helps take into account the speciﬁ  c phenomena 
underlying the successive development of 
risk-taking and risk-aversion among economic 
agents.
4.3.1 GLOBAL LIQUIDITY MAY HELP REFLECT THE 
IMPACT OF FOREIGN ORIGINATED SHOCKS
The globalisation of ﬁ  nancial markets increases 
the importance of foreign developments in 
the domestic monetary policy transmission 
mechanism. In the three years to August 2007, 
the composition of cross-border capital ﬂ  ows 
changed signiﬁ  cantly, from equity and foreign 
For an exhaustive discussion of the recent and past carry trade  34 
episodes involving the yen, see Winters (2008).23
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direct investment to more liquid assets, so 
that a sizeable amount of “global” liquidity 
was created that can move quite freely across 
ﬁ  nancial  markets.35 Consequently, one of the 
most debated issues among central banks at the 
moment is the implication of “global” liquidity 
for the conduct of monetary policy. 
Research conducted at the ECB  36 seems to 
suggest that global excess liquidity affects 
economic conditions in the euro area in a way 
that accords with the theoretical predictions, 
i.e. an expansion (contraction) of global excess 
liquidity increases (reduces) the inﬂ  ationary 
pressures in the euro area. Furthermore, this 
research also shows that domestic liquidity 
conditions are important indicators for 
inﬂ  ationary pressures in the other G7 economies. 
Combining these results, it could be argued that 
the research supports the argument that euro 
area domestic inﬂ  ation is affected by “global” 
inﬂ  ation.
This is a result that other authors obtain  37 in 
different contexts and thus seems to be rather 
robust to modelling and methodological 
differences. However, domestic inﬂ  ation always 
remains in the last analysis a phenomenon 
controllable by domestic monetary policy, as 
explained in the next section. Hence, while 
useful to gauge global inﬂ   ationary risks, it 
remains unclear whether and how such 
information can be used in the context of 
domestic monetary assessments.
Another “global” channel of transmission from 
liquidity conditions to inﬂ   ation involves the 
overshooting of commodity prices following 
a money supply expansion. Browne and 
Cronin (2007) use a cointegrating VAR model 
with US data to show that while both commodity 
and consumer prices are proportional to the 
money supply in the long run, commodity 
prices initially overshoot their new equilibrium 
values in response to a money supply shock, and 
the deviation of commodity prices from their 
equilibrium values has explanatory power for 
subsequent changes in consumer price inﬂ  ation. 
However, this approach does not take into 
account the money supply of countries other 
than the United States or else assumes that such 
money supplies would be strongly correlated 
with the US data, which may be true over some 
periods but not for others.
Also, the concept of global liquidity, while 
helpful at the global level, does not reﬂ  ect 
the tensions generated by cross-border ﬂ  ows, 
which it internalises. Although it can be 
useful to understand global trends, possibly 
complementing the notion of ‘global slack”, 
for instance, in relation to commodity prices, it 
does not help to identify the individual roles of 
national or regional monetary policies. However, 
the increasing importance of capital ﬂ  ows creates 
practical difﬁ  culties for central bankers, be they 
pure inﬂ  ation targeters or be they interested in 
monetary analysis and/or ﬁ  nancial  ﬂ  ows.  In 
the ﬁ  rst case, as argued above, the inclusion of 
asset prices, ﬁ  nancial sectors and capital ﬂ  ows 
in models of the economy would be highly 
desirable, but is not yet easy to achieve. In the 
case of central bankers who are also interested 
in monetary and/or ﬁ  nancial  ﬂ  ows  analysis, 
international capital ﬂ  ows tend to make the link 
between money and prices unstable in the short 
to medium term, so that the direct interpretation 
of monetary aggregates is more difﬁ  cult,  but 
also more promising.
4.3.2 THE ROLE OF MONETARY ANALYSIS
IN IDENTIFYING THE IMPACT OF
CAPITAL FLOWS ON PRICE STABILITY
AND ASSET PRICES
Since monetary aggregates and their 
counterparts at the national or regional level 
reﬂ  ect international capital ﬂ  ows, they may also 
be used to yield essential information on their 
impact and on the risks they create for asset 
price developments. The analysis of monetary 
aggregates and their counterparts, i.e. loans to the 
Coincidentally, over the same period the daily correlation  35 
between changes in the ten-year swap rates in the United States 
and Germany increased to 0.65 from less than 0.2 over the period 
1990-2003 – see Bernanke (2007). The same picture emerges 
for the correlations between interest rate pairs across other
G7 countries.
Rüffer and Stracca (2006). 36 
Ciccarelli and Mojon (2005). 37 24
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private sector and net external assets, allows the 
central bank not only to gauge medium to long-
term inﬂ  ationary risks by correcting monetary 
aggregates for estimated portfolio shifts, but 
also to form scenarios about plausible use of 
the corresponding liquidity. The identiﬁ  cation 
of underlying trends combined with estimation 
of the likely impact on the domestic economy 
of the various capital-ﬂ   ow scenarios allows 
better measurement of developments in prices 
and associated risks. Thus, this analysis helps 
support a “risk management” approach to price 
stability by monetary authorities. 
In this context, a direct approach for taking into 
account asset price movements and inﬂ  ationary 
pressures simultaneously has recently been 
proposed. As shown by De Santis et al. (2008), 
asset prices in the United States and the euro 
area interact with money in the euro area and 
inﬂ   uence the relationship between inﬂ  ation
and monetary aggregates.38 In particular, the 
interplay of Tobin’s q in the two areas closely 
reﬂ  ects the shape of ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows observed in 
the balance of payments of the euro area. The 
inclusion of asset prices in money demand 
functions explains and addresses the instability 
of traditional money demand equations apparent 
after 2001 in the euro area. It also shows that the 
correction of monetary aggregates by ECB staff 
to measure the underlying trend of money 
demand, called ‘portfolio shifts’, was justiﬁ  ed. 
It demonstrates that money and asset prices both 
in the euro area and the United States interact. 
Hence, monetary aggregates have the potential 
to help indicate the risks created by asset price 
developments induced by capital ﬂ  ows. 
For instance, the central bank will tend to 
interpret the moderate growth of both money 
and credit as a sign that money growth is likely 
to be driven by domestic money demand, thus 
posing fewer risks to price stability. Further, 
if money growth is low but credit dynamics 
are more buoyant, it is likely that the net 
external assets of non-monetary ﬁ  nancial 
institutions (non-MFIs) are growing and that 
the domestic economy is ﬁ  nancing investment 
abroad. In these circumstances, the central 
bank may have to form an opinion about likely 
developments in the economies towards which 
domestic capital ﬂ  ows are directed. If it views 
the foreign investment dynamics as led by an 
asset price bubble, it may warn investors and 
communicate its concerns. At the same time 
those capital outﬂ  ows may signal a fundamental 
disequilibrium that may lie, for instance, in 
the domestic ﬁ  scal policy, if it is expected to 
constrain the evolution of inﬂ   ation, or in the 
level of national productivity and consequently 
in the external value of the domestic currency. 
In other circumstances, it may be money that 
grows fast while credit dynamics are subdued. In 
this case, money growth is led by the repatriation 
of foreign investments, whose proceeds 
are normally deposited with local ﬁ  nancial 
institutions and result in an increase in domestic 
money. Typically these repatriation ﬂ  ows  do 
not pose signiﬁ  cant risks to price stability as 
they represent reallocation of wealth portfolios 
and they are unlikely to translate into excess 
demand. However, the central bank should 
monitor credit developments as the boost in 
domestic liquidity may lead ﬁ  nancial institutions 
to relax credit conditions and eventually trigger 
an unsustainable loan binge.
The most complicated combination, however, 
may be the one where money and credit both 
grow quickly. In this case, capital ﬂ  ows  do 
not matter much. The central bank must be 
able to assess if these developments are due 
to fundamental factors, like a more or less 
sustainable increase in productivity growth or a 
positive shock to real estate prices. In the ﬁ  rst 
case, higher credit growth may be compatible 
with a higher desire of households to smooth 
their income over time. By borrowing more 
today, households increase the entire proﬁ  le of 
their consumption path, and they are able to do 
so because their expected real income is higher, 
due to the increase in productivity growth. In 
the second case, credit growth may be driven 
Thus, while the choice of policy regime in one country appears  38 
justiﬁ  able as stability-oriented, it in fact merely transfers possible 
imbalances abroad through the ﬁ  nancial channel and threatens 
the stability of the recipient country ﬁ  nancial system.25
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by the increase in household wealth, eventually 
exacerbated by the characteristics of a domestic 
ﬁ   nancial system that allows households to 
increase their leverage signiﬁ   cantly. In these 
circumstances, central banks need to elaborate 
on possible scenarios and take into account 
the whole transmission mechanism, in order 
to properly assess the nature of the shock 
underlying the money and credit dynamics and 
also the eventual risks to price stability that 
those shocks could create. 
However, as monetary analysis is used at the 
national level rather than the international 
level, it is rarely used to better understand and 
perhaps identify the impact of national policies 
in initiating cross-border capital ﬂ  ows that lead 
to asset price movements abroad and affect 
global liquidity. Indeed, the bursting of an asset 
price bubble in one country, such as Japan, 
may have global consequences if the ﬁ  ght of 
its monetary authorities against subsequent 
deﬂ   ationary trends facilitates carry trades 
towards other zones over an extended period. 
In particular, the deterioration of its ﬁ  scal 
position, if prolonged, may be seen as providing 
a guarantee that interest rates will remain low 
for a lengthy period and encourage outﬂ  ows of 
excess liquidity created to ﬁ  ght against deﬂ  ation. 
This encourages inﬂ  ows in economies offering 
higher interest rates, for instance if their peg to 
another major currency guarantees high rates 
with limited foreign-exchange risk in a period 
of low global volatility. In a similar way, the 
bursting of the high-tech bubble in the United 
States led to substantial capital inﬂ  ows in the 
euro area and to money hoarding, explaining 
substantial growth rates of monetary aggregates 
without corresponding price pressures.
4.3.3 THE EMERGENCE OF NEW FINANCIAL 
MARKET PRODUCTS AND PLAYERS AND 
THE “BEHAVIOURAL” OR “RISK TAKING” 
CHANNEL OF MONETARY POLICY.
The emergence of new categories of investors 
and  ﬁ  nancial intermediaries, whose behaviour 
and incentives  39 may be quite different from 
the traditional categories of market players 
(like banks), has probably modiﬁ   ed the way 
shocks are propagated across ﬁ  nancial markets 
and monetary policy impulses are transmitted 
to the rest of the economy. The same is true of 
the spread in the use of credit derivatives which, 
due to their “off the balance sheet” status, often 
makes the international propagation of their 
effects difﬁ  cult to follow.
First of all, the proliferation of ﬁ  nancial 
intermediaries whose main value added is in 
securitising and making liquid (i.e. tradable in 
the market place) assets that until a few years 
ago would have been highly illiquid and 
remained on the originators’ balance sheet has 
increased the ability of the ﬁ  nancial system to 
multiply liquidity. To be sure, this is by no 
means a problematic development per se, but 
rather one of the desirable outcomes that 
macroeconomic stability (which mostly has to 
be ascribed to the increased quality of monetary 
and ﬁ  scal policy in many countries over the last 
25 years) is supposed to deliver. In a stable 
macroeconomic environment, which is much 
less risky and much friendlier to businesses than 
in the not-so-distant past, higher expected proﬁ  ts 
(and lower risks associated with those proﬁ  t 
expectations) ought to induce greater
risk-taking, and low short-term volatility to 
encourage the creation of market liquidity by 
ﬁ  nancial institutions. Chart 6 below draws on 
balance sheet data of both the US ﬁ  nancial and 
non-ﬁ   nancial corporate sectors to show how 
both sectors of the US economy actively manage 
their own balance sheet.40 Security dealers and 
brokers (which include the once well-known 
large US investment banks), in particular, tend 
to create liquidity during asset price booms and 
drain liquidity during asset prices declines. Such 
behaviour tends to impart “bubbly” dynamics to 
asset prices, thus feeding its own collapse. The 
beneﬁ  cial effects of making speciﬁ  c assets, like 
mortgage loans, liquid become sclerotic once 
the unsustainable dynamics in the price of the 
Rajan (2006). 39 
That is to say that leverage is procyclical. When asset prices  40 
increase, the equity capital of the ﬁ  rm increases, thus reducing its 
leverage (deﬁ  ned as the ratio of assets to equity). If ﬁ  rms tend to 
target a constant – or even increasing – leverage ratio, they must 
incur new debt and purchase new assets.26
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underlying assets (in this case house prices) are 
reversed; ﬁ  nancial institutions engage in massive 
de-leveraging and cause a drainage of market 
liquidity, which hits the global ﬁ  nancial system 
at its heart. 
Furthermore, behavioural shifts have occurred 
(as they always have in past episodes of asset 
price bubbles) that are associated with new 
products and increased incentives for ﬁ  nancial 
market players to pursue risky investment 
strategies. Risk shifting, illiquidity seeking, 
tail-risk seeking and, of course, herding,41 
may affect the way central banks inﬂ  uence the 
economy through the conventional channels 
of transmission. In other words the classic 
channels – interest rate, balance sheet, bank 
lending and liquidity channels – might be 
affected in such a way as to inﬂ  uence  the 
effectiveness of monetary policy to an extent 
that was previously unknown. This is what some 
authors prefer to introduce as a supplementary 
channel, which they call a “behavioural” or 
“risk taking” channel for the transmission of 
monetary policy.
In an era when banks dominated ﬁ  nancial 
systems, bank ofﬁ  cials’ incentives were clear. 
Their salary would rarely depend on banks’ 
short-term investment returns and they thus had 
little interest in seeking extra returns that, being 
more risky, could have jeopardised banks’ 
balance sheet. Shareholders, for their part, were 
happy to enjoy the steady income arising from 
the limited competition in the market for funds 
and the system was able to deliver stable
but inefﬁ  ciently  conservative  ﬁ  nancial 
intermediation ﬂ  ows. In the modern, deregulated 
and competitive environment, investment 
managers in investment banks or in other 
ﬁ  nancial intermediaries have, at least up until 
now, worked with an incentive structure 
commensurate with the new context. As the 
penalty of poor investment performance in the 
new environment was believed to be less drastic 
than a bank run, investment managers may have 
perceived that there was more upside than 
downside to adding risk in order to generate 
extra returns that immediately affected their 
own salaries. In such an environment, what 
really mattered for many investment managers 
was to perform better then their peers or, at least, 
no worse. And this generates two perverse 
consequences.42 First, investment managers try 
to boost returns by investing in assets that have 
Rajan (2006a). 41 
Rajan (2006). 42 
Chart 6 Total asset and leverage growth
(percent quarterly)
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risk characteristics that are easily concealed 
from investors, i.e. assets that perform extremely 
badly in the event of extreme events but offer 
generous returns the rest of the time. The ﬁ  nance 
literature calls these risks “tail risks”. The 
second perverse consequence is the incentive 
for investment managers to herd with competitor 
managers, because this behaviour guarantees 
that they will not underperform their peers. It is 
easy to appreciate how both behaviours tend to 
reinforce each other in periods of asset price 
increases, which provide the impetus for an 
upward spiral that feeds on itself and is prone to 
develop into a credit bubble.
The combination of ﬁ  nancial  innovation 
and behavioural shifts on the part of market 
participants increases the vulnerability of 
the international ﬁ   nancial system to sudden 
gyrations in markets’ risk perceptions and 
tolerance. The explosive dynamics imparted 
by the ability of ﬁ  nancial institutions to pack 
and sell credit-growth risk becomes an equally 
powerful implosive force when risk materialises 
and hits ﬁ   nancial institutions’ balance 
sheets. Furthermore, if losses are realised on
off-balance sheet positions, there is by deﬁ  nition 
no market that can offer actual prices, due to the 
absence of market-makers and clearing houses. 
In such context, liquidity crises can easily erupt 
as most participants have difﬁ  culty assessing the 
soundness of their own balance sheets, let alone 
that of those of their counterparties. 
One clear example of such perverse dynamics 
is the ongoing ﬁ  nancial turmoil that originated 
in the US sub-prime mortgage market. Over the 
period 2002-2005, a combination of rising house 
prices and very low interest rates contributed 
to increase both households’ demand for 
mortgage credit and the risk appetite of ﬁ  nancial 
institutions in search of higher returns. Thanks to 
ﬁ  nancial innovation, primary mortgage lenders 
securitised their loans, which in practice meant 
separating out their lending business from the 
risks implied by holding mortgage loans on their 
own balance sheets. Through mortgage-backed 
derivatives mortgage lenders could lock in their 
return on the mortgage, while the buyers of the 
mortgage risks, mostly hedge funds and non-
bank institutions, could obtain the extra return 
they were seeking. In the absence of market 
players with a higher tolerance for risk, these 
dynamics would not have developed. In normal 
times, such dynamics are beneﬁ  cial  because 
they help allocate capital more efﬁ  ciently  to 
those agents willing to bear particular risk/
return proﬁ  les associated with their investments 
and result in a higher provision of funds to those 
who may need them. 
However, after a signiﬁ   cant decline in house 
prices and the tightening of monetary policy 
that started in 2006, mortgage-loan defaults 
and home foreclosures increased in the
United States, until the market for mortgage-
backed securities came to a sudden standstill in 
August 2007. Credit and liquidity risk increased 
sharply worldwide and the turmoil spread very 
quickly from the United States into global 
ﬁ  nancial markets and from mortgage markets 
to other asset classes, including money markets. 
In those circumstances, ﬁ  nancial  institutions 
around the globe were unable to sell risk in 
the market anymore and were forced to retain 
on their balance sheet a signiﬁ  cant amount of 
non-performing mortgage loans. Hence, such 
institutions had to cut their exposures to other 
investments in order to repair their balance 
sheets and global credit ﬂ  ows dried up sharply.
These developments show that in some 
circumstances the presence of high-risk 
investors with relatively short investment 
horizons can instil perverse dynamics and 
foster asset price bubbles, eventually causing 
leverage in the economy to increase to well 
above a sustainable level. Apart from obvious 
considerations concerning reform of the 
regulatory framework to prevent unsustainable 
credit-creation dynamics ex ante, the changes in 
the ﬁ  nancial markets’ microstructure and their 
ability to engineer and supply more innovative 
and complicated products thus have some 
important implications for monetary policy.
First, central banks have to make sure that they 
avoid the risk of becoming, paradoxically, 28
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victims of their own success in achieving 
macroeconomic stability and earning high 
credibility. Periods of low macroeconomic 
volatility may well be precisely those periods 
when market dynamics “take on a life of their 
own” and depart from all rational considerations 
of possible risks. This implies that central 
banks have a duty to base their analysis, 
recommendations and policy decisions on a 
ﬁ   rm focus on the fundamental trends in the 
economy.
In particular, central banks should be very 
cautious when communicating to the markets 
and the public in general in order to avoid 
fostering unsustainable expectations among 
market participants. In some circumstances, the 
unfounded expectations of a certain future policy 
course may have an amplifying effect on asset 
prices and thus may contribute to the build-up 
of ﬁ  nancial imbalances that quickly unwind in a 
costly way when expectations change. 
Third, central banks should devote maximum 
effort to understanding the extent to which 
the transmission channel of monetary policy 
in a stable macroeconomic environment 
may be affected by both a high degree of 
integration of global ﬁ   nancial markets and 
an ever developing market microstructure. 
For example, globalisation and the perverse 
behaviours spurred by ﬁ  nancial innovation may 
have combined in the last two years to make 
the long end of the yield curve less responsive 
to monetary policy tightening (especially in the 
United States, but also in the euro area) than 
it was expected to be on the basis of historical 
experience. It is very likely, in fact, that global 
savings were ﬂ   owing into the United States 
attracted by the unsustainable low risk-return 
proﬁ  le offered by new ﬁ  nancial products and 
by the mirage that the credit risk premium had 
almost disappeared.
Fourth, central banks need liquidity policies 
well adapted to the occurrence and development 
over time of deep ﬁ  nancial scares. Ex ante, a 
liquidity management framework that allows a 
wide range of high-quality collateral and a large 
number of possible counterparties is helpful 
in maintaining market access for illiquid but 
solvent institutions. Moreover, international 
cooperation is also needed to allow foreign-
currency liquidity to be dispersed across 
domestic banks. 
However, this may not be sufﬁ  cient.  Recent 
developments show that drastic decisions (like 
the acceptance of lower-rated collateral and 
state guarantees for interbank operations) may 
sometimes be needed to reignite markets. Such 
decisions which, de facto, expand the role of 
monetary policy and threaten to reduce the 
efﬁ  ciency  of  ﬁ   nancial markets, also increase 
the risks and the potential ﬁ  scal costs borne by 
the authorities. This begs the question whether 
it would not be desirable to include in central 
banks’ operational framework the possibility of 
pursuing extraordinary liquidity strategies, in 
addition to those aimed at very short-term money 
markets, in order to avoid resort to such extreme 
initiatives. For instance, it is possible to imagine 
a catalytic role for central banks (including the 
use of moral suasion) in reorganising market 
infrastructure and/or maintaining trading activity 
in certain high-quality assets used by banks as 
collateral in their repo operations, when trading 
in low-quality assets is shunned by the ﬁ  nancial 
system. Further, in some circumstances it may 
be possible (and even proﬁ   table) for central 
banks to sell Treasury bills and to accept
high-quality assets in payment, in order to foster 
the appreciation of the latter. Such operations 
might be proﬁ  table for central banks and may 
simultaneously reduce the number of banks 
having to post losses on their trading books. 
These exceptional possibilities should be 
designed in a way that clariﬁ  es the instances 
in which they can be applied and the expected 
exit strategy, in order to minimise moral hazard 
and inefﬁ  cient intervention in money markets. 
It is probably fair to admit that the lack of 
such contingency provisions in central banks’ 
liquidity management framework has deprived 
monetary authorities of tools that could have 
been used to foster the unwinding of the ﬁ  nancial 
turmoil, which was subsequently transformed 
into a ﬁ  nancial crisis. In many cases, despite 29
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having sufﬁ  cient amounts of capital from the 
viewpoint of their Tier 1 ratios, banks became 
illiquid and then insolvent due to the fall in 
the value of high-quality-but-no-longer-traded 
assets. It may thus be argued that some support 
of ﬁ  nancial prices by central banks could have 
avoided the almost complete market standstill 
and might even have avoided recourse to capital 
injections. 
Lastly, it may be important to increase the 
exchange of information between central 
bankers and supervisors, as well as the ability of 
statisticians to follow the development of the 
“off-balance-sheet” positions of ﬁ  nancial 
intermediaries. Also, it may be useful to provide 
incentives for ﬁ  nancial institutions to create and 
trade standardised, exchange-traded securities 
in order to increase transparency and reduce 
systemic risk.43 Standardised securities are 
normally traded through clearing houses that 
ensure that every party to a ﬁ  nancial contract 
meets its own obligations. Furthermore, clearing 
houses continuously mark to market gains and 
losses and impose on the parties to the contract 
margin requirements that depend on valuation 
changes. Hence, margin requirements serve the 
role that capital requirements serve for banks 
and marking to markets allows the state of each 
ﬁ   nancial market’s capital to be monitored 
transparently. Ultimately, counterparty and 
liquidity risk is easier to quantify in real time, 
and the likelihood that credit bubbles (possibly 
involving the creation of obscure ﬁ  nancial 
securities that are not easily detectable in 
ﬁ   nancial institutions’ balance sheets) will 
develop is much lower.
Cecchetti (2007).  43 30
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Recent developments in inﬂ   ation, both in the 
industrialised and in the emerging economies, 
and the propagation of the ﬁ  nancial tensions in 
the United States suggest that globalisation may 
now be entering a new stage. Following a period 
when the opening up of international commodities 
and services markets to the emerging economies 
caused the relative price of manufactured goods 
(and of some services) to decline worldwide, 
the ongoing growth of such markets is now 
contributing to the current upward pressure 
on the price of food and of the raw materials 
employed in their manufacturing sectors. In fact, 
the net effect in industrialised countries is the 
(sometimes signiﬁ  cant) ongoing acceleration in 
domestic inﬂ  ation. Simultaneously, the increase 
in ﬁ  nancial pressures evidenced by the ongoing 
deepening of the ﬁ  nancial turmoil shows that 
globalisation also entails the risk of rapid 
transmission of ﬁ  nancial pressures.
Globalisation, which initially seemed 
characterised by its downward impact on prices 
and inﬂ  ation, is now increasingly recognised as 
a complex factor with multiple inﬂ  uences. While 
its potential for generating upward pressures on 
inﬂ   ation is fully recognised, its other effects, 
including the rapid transmission of ﬁ  nancial 
shocks, are also apparent. This has generated 
questions of many types: has the ability of 
national central banks to control inﬂ  ation  at 
the national level been impaired? Conversely, 
can the propagation of ﬁ   nancial scares be 
controlled or prevented? In particular, which 
techniques should be adopted or developed 
by central bankers to facilitate such control? 
Beyond macroeconomic considerations, how 
should money market liquidity be managed in 
the context of international ﬁ  nancial  turmoil? 
More generally, what role should be given 
to international cooperation in such ﬁ  elds? 
This section ﬁ   rst considers the impact of 
globalisation on the case for domestically 
conducted monetary policies and considers the 
evolution of techniques used by central bankers 
in the macroeconomic ﬁ  eld. It then addresses 
the challenges arising from ﬁ  nancial innovation 
and integration. Finally, it addresses the need 
for enhanced international co-ordination.
5.1  GLOBALISATION AND MONETARY 
POLICY: THE CASE FOR A DOMESTICALLY 
CONDUCTED MONETARY POLICY
Globalisation does not weaken the case for a 
domestically conducted monetary policy pursuing 
price stability over the medium term. In the event 
of capital and/or goods market integration, greater 
openness does not impair the ability of domestic 
monetary policy to control inﬂ  ation. Inﬂ  ation is 
ultimately always a monetary phenomenon, i.e. a 
phenomenon that the central bank can control. 
In a recent contribution, Woodford (2007) uses 
an open-economy structural model to make that 
point, i.e. that neither a high degree of ﬁ  nancial 
market integration  44 nor a greater role for a 
“global” measure of economic slack in domestic 
supply dynamics is likely to weaken the ability of 
national central banks to control the dynamics of 
domestic inﬂ  ation. In the same vein, Taylor (2008) 
argues that there exists clear evidence based on 
various models that monetary policy cooperation 
does not deliver additional gains to those provided 
by domestic monetary policy. Thus, he concludes 
that in the most efﬁ   cient monetary policy 
framework, central banks may act on their own, 
insofar as they incorporate into their decisions the 
expected actions of the other central banks. In 
such a framework, it is crucial that monetary 
policy authorities exchange information so that 
each of them can incorporate the others’ monetary 
policy reaction into its own decisions. 
However, globalisation has brought some 
signiﬁ  cant challenges and requires new aspects 
of monetary policy to be investigated in order 
to ensure the maintenance of price stability. 
In the words of Rogoff (2006), globalisation, 
through both goods and asset-price arbitrage, 
“is weakening the grip of individual central 
banks over the trajectory of domestic real 
Financial integration in Woodford’s analysis is captured by  44 
allowing global liquidity to be the determinant of the domestic 
interest rate and allowing global savings and investment 
to determine the domestic equilibrium real interest rate.31
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interest rates, except at relatively short 
horizons”. Moreover, recent developments such 
as the GSE crisis and the bankruptcy of several 
investment banks in the United States make 
clear that propagation risks have enormously 
increased. Hence, the monetary policy 
implications of the changes in the transmission 
mechanism engineered by both the structural 
changes described in Sections 2 and 3 and the 
four stylised facts discussed in Section 4 have 
to be drawn. 
5.2  GLOBALISATION AND MONETARY POLICY: 
FACING THE CHALLENGES OF STRUCTURAL 
CHANGES
The  ﬁ   rst implication of the changes in the 
monetary policy transmission mechanism due to 
globalisation is the need for central banks to go 
beyond simple models and to widen the battery 
of tools used to gauge inﬂ  ationary  pressures, 
including structural analysis in the assessment 
process. Structural analysis, in conjunction with 
other models and indicators, can be very useful 
in identifying possible shocks to the economy 
but also in devising the right response to them.
First, simple rules and concepts like “output 
gap” or “core inﬂ   ation” are increasingly 
insufﬁ   cient, as explained in Section 2. As a 
consequence, a more sophisticated analysis is 
necessary. Second, a structural understanding of 
global shocks is increasingly needed, and thus 
DSGE models are increasingly useful, especially 
as they have adjustable production functions 
and adjustable exchange rate pass-through.
The actual ﬂ  exibility of various markets needs 
to be taken into account, as well as the impact 
of international competition on the length 
of the adjustments needed and hence on the 
shape of the business cycle. Third, the impact 
of globalisation on inﬂ   ation perceptions and 
the credibility of the central bank should not 
be forgotten. In particular, it is now necessary 
for central bankers to take into account the risk 
of second-round effects and of a dispersion of 
inﬂ   ation expectations in order to ensure that 
economic agents concentrate on the adequate 
response to the challenges faced. Hence, 
credibility and inﬂ  ationary perceptions should 
be measured and, if possible, modelled. Finally, 
for this reason, communication, transparency 
and competence are increasingly pivotal for 
central banks. It is particularly important for 
them to convince ﬁ  scal authorities to avoid any 
measure that would amplify inﬂ  ation or delay 
the economic adjustment.
5.3  GLOBALISATION AND MONETARY POLICY: 
FACING THE CHALLENGES OF FINANCIAL 
INTEGRATION
Facing the challenges of ﬁ  nancial  integration 
requires even further adjustment in the 
behaviour of central banks. First, they need to 
acknowledge that asset prices developments, 
may more often than usually expected, lead to 
abrupt price changes; the frequency of fat-tail 
events is not consistent with usual Gaussian 
distributions. Second, they need to learn how 
to monitor the ﬂ   ows of liquidity which help 
propagate the development of asset price 
bubbles and often underlie the development of 
global imbalances. This is complicated by the 
fact that capital ﬂ  ows may prompt asset price 
movements across borders and that money may 
shift from one type of asset to another when 
liquidity allows it to. Third, central banks need to 
learn how to “lean against the wind” efﬁ  ciently. 
It is now apparent that asymmetric central 
bank responses, such as the ones advocated by 
A. Greenspan, end up encouraging moral hazard 
and are eventually counterproductive. Indeed, 
an effective approach to risk management 
must also be forward looking. The size and the 
duration, as well as the contagious nature of 
the current ﬁ   nancial turmoil strongly support 
this point, which also ﬁ  nds some support at the 
theoretical level. Indeed, Loisel et al. (2007) 
show, in a closed economy context, that there 
exist particular situations in which a central 
bank can usefully lean against the wind. These 
cases are characterised by asset price bubbles 
that develop on account of herding behaviour 
by entrepreneurs who take investment decisions 
on the basis of other entrepreneurs’ decisions 
rather than on the basis of fundamental signals 
arising from the economy. By increasing the 32
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cost of borrowing in response to the observed 
herding behaviour, the central bank can curb 
the investment of herding entrepreneurs, which 
is very sensitive to the cost of borrowing, and 
thus reduce the risk of asset price bubbles. 
Those entrepreneurs who actually invest on 
the basis of fundamental rationale will be only 
marginally hit, since for these entrepreneurs the 
expected return on the investment is not equal to 
the borrowing cost. 
This is not to say that the identiﬁ  cation of asset 
price bubbles does not remain difﬁ  cult.  Nor 
does it imply that central banks are always able 
to inﬂ  uence asset prices, or that central banks 
should ‘prick asset price bubbles’. Irrational 
exuberance is indeed a reality, but targeting 
asset prices directly would give rise to moral 
hazard even more directly than asymmetrical 
behaviour. Rather, central banks should develop 
a broad range of models and indicators in order 
to ensure that the fundamental analysis of asset 
price developments is as robust as possible. The 
persistence of unexplained paths for the residuals 
across statistical and econometric models and 
possible instability in their parameters may well 
be a warning light that a bubble is in the making. 
The recent ﬁ  nancial crisis is a case in point, as the 
excessive decrease in risk premia up to 2007 was 
for many a clear sign of asset price disequilibria 
and excess liquidity.45 The recent turmoil has 
clearly shown that ﬁ   nancial globalisation may 
amplify and spread across the world’s ﬁ  nancial 
markets the effects of inefﬁ  cient  market 
behaviour.46 Hence, central banks should devote 
more resources to the analysis of global capital 
ﬂ  ows and to their impact on developments in the 
domestic savings-investment balance and in 
current accounts across economic areas, which 
may prove to be unsustainable. There is also a 
need for increasing inclusion of ﬁ  nancial frictions 
in DSGE models and, in particular, of both a 
non-ﬁ  nancial sector and a banking sector. 
Moreover, monitoring and analysing monetary 
aggregates with a view to identifying underlying 
trends also leads to identiﬁ  cation of the asset 
prices that have a more volatile impact on 
such aggregates. This systematic monitoring 
naturally leads to the construction of “risk 
scenarios” addressing the likely developments 
in a certain part of the economy or of ﬁ  nancial 
markets. In this way the policymaker can assess 
the relative probabilities of a larger number of 
uncertain future developments and, thus, make 
a more robust assessment of its own monetary 
policy stance.47 
Hence, central banks should consider the 
possibility of adjusting their monetary policy 
stance in response to excessive asset price 
movements, when there is a high probability 
that capital ﬂ  ows and credit dynamics are driven 
by self-fulﬁ   lling expectations of continuously 
increasing asset prices or unrealistic expectations 
about the developments in fundamentals. The 
cost of inaction may, in some cases, be much 
higher than the negative wealth effects of 
bursting the bubbles and may lead to periods 
of heightened ﬁ   nancial (and possibly also 
economic) instability. It is important however 
that such action is not perceived as targeting 
asset prices. In fact, its goal should be to 
avoid such prices departing further from their 
equilibrium level rather than supporting them 
at any such level. A good candidate strategy for 
such purpose is the two-pillar strategy used by 
the ECB.48 As monetary and credit aggregates 
often reﬂ  ect the risks of bubbles in the economy 
without being associated with speciﬁ  c  asset 
markets, it allows the central banker to avoid the 
moral hazard associated with ‘leaning against 
the wind’.49
See the Overview in ECB (2007), pp. 9-15.  45 
The strand of economic literature dealing with “behavioural  46 
ﬁ  nance” analyses various reasons why ﬁ  nancial market prices 
may depart from their fundamental-based values (see Shleifer     
(2001) and Abreu and Brunnermaier (2002)).
See Stark (2007). 47 
See Trichet (2005). 48 
Ultimately, this approach would not differ in substance from the  49 
approach that central banks already adopt when exchange rates 
depart from their estimated “fundamental” value. In normal 
times, the central banks of large economic areas do not intervene 
in the foreign exchange markets to avoid creating conﬂ  icts with 
their primary objective of domestic price stability. However, 
occasionally these central banks may ﬁ  nd it optimal to intervene 
in a coordinated manner in order to “throw sand in the wheels” 
of speculators, when their internal analyses show that actual 
exchange rate developments are not compatible with any of the 
models that are supposed to explain exchange rate behaviour. 33
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The greater role of international ﬁ  nancial 
transactions in the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism requires however that monetary 
policy authorities gain more insight and 
expertise in the analysis of ﬁ  nancial  market 
microstructure, including the functioning of ever 
newer and more complicated ﬁ  nancial products. 
The analysis of monetary aggregates and their 
counterparts with a view to gauging the medium 
to long-term risks to price stability can help to 
detect possible bubble developments in asset 
markets if a detailed knowledge of the ﬁ  nancial 
microstructure and of ﬁ   nancial products is 
available to the central bank. 
Hence, available assessments of the stability 
of the domestic and the international ﬁ  nancial 
system should be routinely taken into account 
in the assessment of the monetary policy stance 
and the risks to price stability. By considering 
ﬁ   nancial stability issues in ﬁ  nancial  stability 
reports only, central bankers may miss important 
elements in their evaluation and risk being caught 
by surprise by the unwinding of asset market 
bubbles. The latter may be fostered by the same 
low volatility environment that the central bank 
has contributed to establish and, in particular, by 
possibly persistent changes in the size and quality 
of international capital ﬂ  ows. Furthermore, the 
decline in investors’ “home bias” exposes any 
economy to the possibility that the beneﬁ  ts of 
asset diversiﬁ   cation (in terms of low output 
and inﬂ  ation volatility) may abruptly evaporate 
and sharp asset price changes in international 
asset markets may lead to severe income and 
wealth losses in the domestic economy. In this 
respect, central banks and supervisory authorities 
should cooperate in order to provide monetary 
authorities with a thorough analysis of the risks 
embedded in the ﬁ   nancial system, which is 
constantly evolving both in terms of products and 
of the characteristics of its players. 
Finally, the current ﬁ   nancial turmoil shows 
the need for: a high degree of consistency 
between central banks’ operational frameworks; 
organisation at the national level of the function 
of lender of last resort; and central bank 
responsibility for ﬁ  nancial stability.
An important lesson for central banks of the 
recent ﬁ  nancial turmoil is the need to avoid the 
increase in risk premia, in periods of heightened 
volatility, not only affecting the markets in 
longer-dated securities but also putting money 
markets under stress. The collapse in the 
US mortgage market has called into question 
the ability of ﬁ  nancial institutions to engineer 
ﬁ   nancial products that actually do transform 
previously illiquid assets (i.e. mortgages) into 
easily tradable instruments. When the mortgage 
market crisis erupted in June 2007, the liquidity 
ﬂ  ows suddenly dried up and what started as a 
problem in a quite limited segment of the world’s 
ﬁ  nancial markets quickly spilled over into other 
markets, including the one for very short-term 
securities. Thus, it became an urgent issue for 
central banks to avoid the compounding of credit 
and liquidity risks bringing the international 
ﬁ   nancial markets to the verge of collapse. 
Since June 2007, the major central banks of 
the world have engaged in “extraordinary” 
liquidity injections, which have enabled money 
markets to function again. In this respect, the 
ECB’s operational framework, which allows 
a wide range of collateral and a large number 
of institutions to participate in its reﬁ  nancing 
tenders, proved to be very useful in absorbing 
the sudden increase in risk premia and restoring 
the orderly functioning of money markets. 
Hence, it is preferable to furnish the central bank 
with an operational framework that allows it to 
lend to all solvent counterparties against 
high-quality collateral rather than to a limited 
set of counterparties. This allows a clear 
distinction to be made between operations which 
do not carry ﬁ  nancial risk for the central bank 
and operations which do carry such risk. If 
low-quality collateral needs to be accepted from 
a counterparty judged solvent, such operation 
can effectively be called emergency liquidity 
activity and be undertaken at the responsibility 
of the central bank. Moreover, it is important 
that, in the central bank statute or in an explicit 
and formal agreement with ﬁ  scal authorities, the 
cost of eventual ﬁ   nancial losses created by 
insolvent counterparties be fully borne by those 
ﬁ  nancial institutions themselves. In a context in 34
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which large banks can become insolvent, this 
ensures the independence of the central bank 
and the soundness of its balance sheet. For the 
ECB and the Eurosystem, this is ensured by 
Article 101 of the Treaty which forbids the 
direct  ﬁ   nancing or subsidisation of other 
European institutions by the Eurosystem. 
Finally, this overall organisation, including the 
‘leaning against the wind’ part, is consistent 
with a system in which a central bank contributes 
to  ﬁ   nancial stability rather than being fully 
responsible for it.50 
5.4  GLOBALISATION AND INTERNATIONAL 
POLICY COOPERATION  51 
The greater integration of ﬁ  nancial markets and 
the role of new countries in the global exchange 
of capital also challenge international fora to 
strive for better analysis and understanding 
of the ongoing changes in the international 
ﬁ   nancial system. Since the 1980s, many 
systemic crises have occurred that have had 
different explanations and that have developed 
in different ways. Each of these crisis episodes 
has led international institutions to learn from 
their mistakes and implement monitoring and 
cooperation frameworks that reduced the risks of 
a similar crisis. The G7 has been instrumental in 
shaping the international ﬁ  nancial architecture, 
as it reacted to the need to better involve 
emerging market economies. In particular, since 
the creation of the Group of Twenty (G20) forum 
of ﬁ  nance ministers and central bank governors 
in 1999, emerging market countries have been 
involved in global economic and ﬁ  nancial 
stability issues like exchange rate regimes, 
prudent debt management, domestic ﬁ  nancial 
deepening and international codes and standards. 
The G20 has also played an important role in 
forging consensus on reforms of the Bretton 
Woods institutions and has been constructively 
involved in helping shape mechanisms for crisis 
prevention and resolution.
However, the development and integration of 
global  ﬁ   nancial markets pose new challenges 
to policymakers and suggest that international 
cooperation needs to take new forms in order 
to address such challenges. The multilateral 
consultation procedure inaugurated and 
sponsored by the IMF in 2006 (on Global 
Imbalances) may prove to be the right forum 
for his purpose, assuming that the analysis is 
broadened to fully incorporate the interrelated 
dynamics of global ﬁ   nancial markets. In 
particular, the multilateral consultation procedure 
should take a global perspective and assess 
the risk to monetary and ﬁ  nancial stability by 
taking into account both the possible existence, 
assessment and prospective impact of asset price 
disequilibria and their international channels 
of transmission. For example, phenomena like 
global imbalances and carry-trade ﬁ  nancial 
ﬂ  ows, as discussed in Section 4.2.2, should be 
analysed from a multilateral viewpoint because 
the possible domestic policy misalignments or 
the development of an asset price bubble can 
easily have a signiﬁ  cant repercussion on the risks 
to price and ﬁ  nancial stability in other parts of 
the world. In particular, a multilateral exercise 
that also focuses on capital ﬂ  ows and their nature 
could help in assessing asset price developments 
and eventually help central banks to set monetary 
policy in a manner that incorporates the risk of 
a bubble building up and eventually bursting 
in the medium term. Such “leaning against the 
wind” would not be intended to prick the bubble 
but rather to avoid a monetary policy stance 
that passively contributes (by facilitating credit 
growth) to the inﬂ  ating of the bubble. Hence, it 
is relevant to examine whether excess liquidity 
ﬂ  ows in an open economy context may not also 
spur asset price bubbles.
Finally, better cooperation in terms of liquidity 
provision is also needed. A ﬁ   rst example of 
successful cooperation is provided by the 
auctions of US dollar liquidity, jointly organised 
by the Federal Reserve, the ECB and the SNB 
since the start of the turmoil in mid-2007. 
See Bini-Smaghi (2008), Uhlig (2008) and Goodfriend (2008).  50 
Here, international “cooperation” indicates a more or less formal  51 
framework which facilitates the exchange of information among 
policymakers and the sharing of views about the nature and the 
consequences of particular international policy considerations. 
The term “cooperation” does not signify any act by various 
policy authorities that would imply a common decision with 
immediate consequence for their respective policy instrument. 35
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Widespread adoption of such arrangements 
might be envisaged to deal with other crises in 
the future. Moreover, international institutions 
should better understand the dynamics of 
liquidity crises and be able to advise countries 
on their best strategies. Furthermore, it might 
be asked how the participation of countries in 
such cooperation should optimally be organised. 
Who might join such cooperation and how 
should the risks to those countries which do not 
participate be monitored? Lastly, how should the 
corresponding swap agreements and the various 
other facilities made available by regional or 
international institutions be made compatible? 36
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6 CONCLUSION
Globalisation is a dynamic, multi-faceted 
phenomenon that changes the structure of 
national economies and the way shocks are 
propagated both within a single economy and 
across the world. In particular, the emergence of 
large countries participating in global markets 
for goods, services and ﬁ   nancial assets is 
likely to affect inﬂ  ation developments in new 
ways that are, to some extent, still unexplored 
by central banks. This paper argues that the 
challenges posed by globalisation do not call 
for greater “coordination” of monetary policies 
across the world. National monetary policies, 
which are oriented towards the maintenance 
of domestic price stability, are still the 
most efﬁ   cient solution to control inﬂ  ation 
developments and, consequently, to contribute 
to ﬁ  nancial stability. 
Nevertheless, globalisation has probably 
contributed to some major changes in the way 
central banks ought to perform their duties. 
The fact that changes may have occured in the 
economic relationships driving output growth 
and price formation mechanisms and the 
proliferation of external shocks, of a varied 
nature, that can hit the domestic economy suggests 
that central banks should devote more effort to 
structural analysis than in the past. A robust, 
“risk-managing” approach to monetary policy 
must be able to identify as precisely as possible 
shocks, the way they are transmitted to the 
domestic economy and, ultimately, how they 
can affect domestic inﬂ  ation. 
In particular, central banks must take into 
account how the evolution of ﬁ  nancial markets’ 
structure and their increased interdependence 
may play out in the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism. Liberal and innovative capital 
markets may have a non-negligible role in 
the creation of liquidity, which is not always 
necessarily aligned with the central banks’ 
objective of price stability. In this respect, the 
ongoing ﬁ  nancial crisis has demonstrated that 
ﬁ  nancial stability considerations are not always 
separable from the analysis of the risks to price 
stability, but rather should be part of the normal 
assessment of the monetary policy stance. As a 
consequence, it is conceivable that central banks 
may, under certain conditions that are admittedly 
very difﬁ  cult to meet in reality, use monetary 
policy to “lean against the wind” of possible 
asset price bubbles, if the eventual bursting is 
judged to pose signiﬁ  cant risks to price stability. 
In this case, the high uncertainty surrounding 
the existence of a bubble in a particular asset 
market should be weighed against the eventual 
costs of the bursting, without ruling out “tail” 
events. The analysis of monetary and credit 
aggregates can provide valuable information to 
help identify the risks of a bubble bursting. 
Finally, the increased interdependence of 
ﬁ   nancial markets across the world and the 
possible impact that ﬁ  nancial  ﬂ   ows can have 
on the global economy suggest that multilateral 
policy cooperation should take new forms. 
In particular, the already existing surveillance 
framework should be enlarged in order to 
encompass a thorough analysis of domestic 
and international capital markets, including the 
possible impact that domestic monetary policies 
may have on capital ﬂ  ows and on the liquidity 
conditions in each country.37
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